that the ombudsperson stays in close touch with the changes in society. Therefore it seems important that a new ombudsperson is appointed at regular intervals, while at the same time, the continuity of the office should be ensured through the other staff, whose term of office would not run concurrently with that of the ombudsperson. Finally, it needs to be determined whether there is a possibility of reappointment. The Paris Principles leave that option open. If reappointment is possible, the question arises whether there is a limit to the amount of times that it can be renewed. Here similar considerations apply as regards the choice for an appointment for life versus for a fixed term discussed above. The Act of legislation establishing the institution should identify clearly the conditions for and procedure of dismissal of the ombudsman prior to the end of term. It is crucial that an exhaustive list of grounds for dismissal is specified. Another important issue concerning the independence of the ombudsperson is his/her security of tenure. This would require that there are strict and stringent requirements for removal prior to the ombudsperson’s end of term or for suspension of office. It is advisable to have an exhaustive and detailed list of grounds for which removal is possible in order to secure the independence of the institution. In order to secure continuity and at the same time protect the security of the position of the ombudsperson, regulations for procedures when an ombudsperson is ill or incapacitated (temporarily versus permanently) should also be clearly set out. PART II If one then opts for a fixed term of office, it must be decided how long the term should be. The national pieces of legislation show a certain variety, ranging from four to about six years. The need to have some continuity and stability in the ombudsman institution would argue against the term of office of the ombudsperson being tied with that of parliament, so that the appointment of the ombudsperson is not politicized or linked to a particular parliament. A term of office longer than that of the parliament, for example, six years, is recommendable. Despite the strong focus on independence in the Paris Principles, they do not contain a clause dealing with removal or suspension of the ombudsperson. Most existing national pieces of legislation concerning ombudspersons do provide such guarantees in the sense that the Act establishing the office prescribes the procedure to be followed as well as an exhaustive list of grounds that can lead to removal. It seems important that the establishing Act clearly indicates what person/body can make the final decision concerning removal. To maintain independence, the final decision/responsibility should not lie with the executive/government authorities. If, however, the executive does hold this power, it should be strictly circumscribed regarding the grounds for removal and the fairness of the process. In this case it may be additionally important that the decision be reviewable by a court of law. Secondly, the establishing Act has to determine the grounds on which an ombudsperson can be removed. To safeguard the independence of the office, it is essential that a limited, exhaustive list of grounds is established and that these grounds are clearly and unambiguously formulated. While there is a degree of variety between the grounds of removal in the national pieces of legislation concerned, recurrent themes are disability, being convicted for certain offences, incompetence, or malfunctioning of some kind. There should in any event be sufficient guarantees for an equitable removal process, including, for example, that the ombudsperson is fairly heard. 47