Employment Conditions – Remuneration, Tenure and Dismissal PART II Clear regulations as to positions incompatible with that of ombudsperson, and the remuneration of the ombudsperson are essential to guarantee the institution’s independence. In view of the crucial nature of the independence of the ombudsperson, his or her status should not be one of civil servant, but preferably one of an independent authority. It would seem acceptable that he or she would be an officer of parliament as long as independence from parliament is ensured. Similarly, the office should be answerable and accountable to parliament (e.g., with its annual report), not to the executive government. A list of incompatible employment/positions is also essential for the independence and impartiality of the ombudsperson. It is often stated in establishing legislation that the position of ombudsperson should not be combined with any other remunerated position. Clear regulations on how remuneration for the ombudsperson is established is also important to guarantee the independence of the institution. It would seem advisable to use certain benchmarks, such as parity with a certain type of judge. It is in any event important for independence reasons that it is set in a manner which is beyond the authority and control of the executive government. The pension regulation should also be specified in the establishing legislation. A fixed term of office not linked to the term of office of parliament is the preferred option for tenure. To secure an independent status there should not only be sufficient guarantees against arbitrary removal (see below) but there should also be clarity about the term of office of the ombudsperson, which should not be dependent on executive decisions. There are two main possibilities for the term of office of the ombudsman. The main division is between appointment for life versus appointment for a fixed period of time. In the case of a fixed term of office, there are two further issues, namely whether there is a relation to the term of parliament and whether there are any, limited or unlimited, possibilities for reappointment. The Paris Principles state that the official act which effects the establishment of the human rights institution (in this case the minority ombudsperson) shall specify the specific duration of the mandate. Arguably this seems to preclude an appointment for life (which is normally the case for judges). The latter is further confirmed by the following statement from the Principles: “This mandate may be renewable, provided that the pluralism of the institution’s membership is ensured.” An appointment for life (until the age of retirement) would enhance the independence of the institution. At the same time continuity would be ensured, which facilitates the possibility of acquiring substantial, accumulated experience and knowledge, as well as potentially improving the status of the ombudsperson as a known figure in society. However, an appointment for life might stifle the dynamism of the office, the ongoing renewal of its practices and style of operation. It is indeed vital 46