A/HRC/32/40 settlement claims.23 There is no ceiling on the tribunal’s compensation awards, and decisions are binding without appeal. As a result, the investor-State dispute settlement process has also had an undeniably chilling effect on the enforcement of rights, as States are less likely to rule in favour of the public if they are required to pay exorbitant fees as settlements. Remedies have also been disproportionately skewed in favour of high-income countries (see A/70/301). Violation of the right to information, lack of transparency and meaningful participation in public affairs 64. The recent negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trade in Services Agreement, which comprise at least two thirds of global trade in services, highlight the lack of transparency, opportunities for public dialogue and accountability surrounding trade negotiations. Like other mandate holders, the Special Rapporteur remains concerned about the extent to which transnational corporate interests have prevailed over public discourse and accountability for observing human rights standards. Although trade regimes have a significant impact on the lives of migrants, they rarely offer migrants or their representatives opportunities for meaningful participation in negotiation processes, which violates migrants’ fundamental rights to selfdetermination, access to information and public participation. The Special Rapporteur is not aware of migrants’ groups being consulted in these negotiations; more broadly, civil society does not participate in trade negotiations sufficiently. Despite power imbalances in the international trade regime, States repeatedly fail to reform trade negotiations to make them more transparent or strengthen accountability through enforcement against related rights violations. 65. The Special Rapporteur is pleased that the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement includes binding provisions allowing any person residing in either country to submit a written inquiry to the national authorities and obliging the Governments to make the questions and responses public. He stresses, however, that it is important that the terms of such provisions be clear and actually provide meaningful opportunities for participation. Merits of bilateral labour mobility regulation 66. Since the 1960s, the emergence of bilateral labour mobility agreements to govern medium- and low-wage migration has been a positive development, as States have greater flexibility to facilitate mobility across skills levels, address social protection gaps and respond to labour market needs than in the multilateral trade framework. ILO estimates that, in 2015, at least 358 bilateral labour mobility agreements were in existence.24 67. A recent shift towards incorporating mobility in framework agreements, memorandums of understanding and declarations of mutual cooperation has resulted in States treating labour mobility agreements as informal and non-binding. In Asia, almost 70 per cent of labour mobility arrangements employ the informal framework provided by memorandums of understanding, compared with 30-40 per cent in Africa, Europe and the Americas.25 68. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that bilateral labour mobility agreements erode existing social and mobility protections granted through commitments in other agreements, which increases the precariousness of workers by exposing them to the vulnerabilities of 23 24 25 Ibid. International Labour Office, Bilateral Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding on Migration of Low Skilled Workers: A Review (Geneva, 2015). Ibid. 15