A/55/280/Add.2 extremism while being careful not to offend Muslims, and this is an extremely hazardous process. According to the experts, most of the population, afflicted by poverty and illiteracy, is committed to religion without truly understanding it. This makes is easier (especially for extremists) to manipulate this Muslim population, especially their religious orientation. Evidence of this is provided by the absence of a popular reaction against fatwas and by repeated instances in which extremists have recklessly and violently mobilized crowds against the Ahmadis and non-Muslim minorities (such instances occur during certain international events, such as the Gulf War, or during attempts to impose certain constraints or restrictions on the activities of minorities, to confiscate assets, etc.) 53. Despite the existence of institutions such as the Islamic Foundation, which function as tools for State education of Muslims, the Government’s room for manoeuvre is limited, and sometimes reduced to zero, when electoral considerations prevail. According to the non-governmental experts, this explains the secondary importance accorded to minorities, for example with respect to their integration and advancement within State circles, with respect to the provision of adequate financial support for religious activities (religious education, for example) and religious institutions, and with respect to the protection of non-Muslims (intervention by the forces of law and order during attacks against minorities was said to be either halfhearted or non-existent, while action against those responsible was said to be often non-existent or ineffective). According to the non-governmental representatives, the Government’s position, cited above, helps to explain the delays in the implementation of the Peace Accord concerning the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as well as the absence of measures designed to eradicate the remaining vestiges of polygamy and end legislation affecting vulnerable groups (minorities and women), or to provide a definitive sanction against the illegal practice of imposing fatwas. It also explains the half-hearted nature of the struggle against extremists responsible for attacks against the Ahmadis. Indeed, the fact that the authorities have recognized the Ahmadi community, despite its rejection as a community within Islam in most Muslim countries, could lead to controversy, fuelled by extremists, among the majority of Bangladesh’s Muslim believers and religious officials, who are often poorly educated and traditionalist in their approach to Islam and its interpretations. Development of this very sensitive question might place the authorities in difficulty with respect to the Muslim electorate. 54. Non-governmental sources also noted that these problems could not, of course, be dissociated from difficulties shared by most developing countries, such as the weakness of public institutions and the very difficult economic and social conditions. C. Consultations with a representative of the Jamat-e-Islami party 55. A senior representative of the Jamat-e-Islami party in Dhaka presented his organization as an Islamic movement similar to that of the “Muslim brothers,” in the sense that it was not purely political and aimed to changed society as a whole through democratic means (due to the absence of constraints in Islam) and Islamic means (through social and educational programmes aimed at training Muslims in the principles of Islam for use in both their public and private lives, based on the idea that Islam is a way of life). He explained that Jamat-e-Islami comprised 150,000 grass-roots militants and 12,000 officials distributed among the centre, the districts and the villages, as well as elected emirs and a Shura Council. He noted that his organization was historically linked to Pakistan, during the period when Pakistan included present-day Bangladesh, but that since independence there had been no further organizational links with the Pakistani Jamat-e-Islami. He recalled that his organization had, at the time, opposed Bangladeshi independence, but he rejected any suggestion that it had violated human rights during that period. He stated that Jamat-e-Islami was not an extremist organization, and stressed that it was opposed to all forms of intolerance and violence directed, not only at non-Muslims, but also at Muslims having a different interpretation of Islam. He condemned the use of religion for political purposes, but noted that Islam was not restricted solely to the realm of religious belief. He recalled that since 1976, when the constitutional prohibition of religious parties was lifted, Jamat-e-Islami had been able to resume its activities. He believed that the defeat of his organization in the recent parliamentary elections did not indicate society’s rejection of an organization regarded as extremist, and was instead a reflection of the policies — and perhaps incompetence — of those leading Jamat-e-Islami at the time. He said that his organization was subject to political violence (which 13