CERD/C/103/D/60/2016 including the procedural issue concerning reversal of the burden of proof, the Committee notes that the State party did not provide any specific arguments. 8.6 In its assessment of whether the petitioner has been afforded effective remedies by the domestic courts as required under article 6 of the Convention, the Committee first recalls its jurisprudence establishing that presumed victims of racial discrimination are not required to show that there was discriminatory intent against them.16 Although the Committee is mindful of the national legislation of the State party providing for reversal of the burden of proof in discrimination matters,17 it recalls the petitioner’s claim that the domestic courts failed to apply these domestic laws in accordance with the Convention. In this respect, the Committee notes the argument of the petitioner that Centru District Court in Chisinau held it against him that he did not provide evidence regarding his ethnic origin, other than his own statement. In this connection, the Committee recalls that identifying persons as members of an ethnic or racial group should be based upon self-identification by the person concerned, if there is no justification to the contrary.18 8.7 Furthermore, the Committee takes note of the petitioner’s claim that the domestic courts gave too much weight to the circumstance that instead of securing employment, he requested compensation as a remedy in the court procedure. The Committee observes that the courts relied on the petitioner’s choice in order to assume that he had never intended to work for the company, which presumption seems to have weakened his discrimination claim in the domestic court’s assessment. The Committee underlines that the choice of a particular remedy may not negatively affect the examination of a discrimination claim, even in cases where the alleged victim of discrimination does not wish to work for the company concerned. 8.8 Furthermore, the Committee notes with concern the fact that the domestic courts established that the petitioner’s decision not to bring his case before the Council on Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality confirmed the absence of a “real situation of discrimination”. In this respect, the Committee notes that the fact that the petitioner opted for a judicial avenue, which, in addition to declaratory relief, is capable of providing compensation, cannot put him in an adverse position. 8.9 Lastly, the Committee observes that it appears from the court documents that instead of requiring the respondent company to justify the differential treatment of the petitioner by specifying the exact reasons for his non-hiring, despite the advisory opinion provided by the Council on Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality drawing the courts’ attention to the need for reversal of the burden of proof in discrimination cases and giving some guidance as to the interpretation of the term “essential occupational requirements”, the courts relied heavily on witness testimonies of other employees attesting to the non-discriminatory environment in which they carried out their daily duties. The Committee is concerned, however, that the information collected from persons who are of a different age, gender and ethnicity than the petitioner and who are employed in other positions does not guarantee that these persons were in an identical situation to the petitioner. It also disregards the possibility of intersectionality, 19 and of “ethnic hierarchies” in the labour market as have been demonstrated by comparative field experiments in Europe, and underestimates the occurrence of discriminatory treatment arising in “isolated” and specific circumstances, or even with mixed motives, not as a part of a systematic policy or treatment, especially in the absence of any specific explanation by the respondent company in relation to the petitioner’s rejection. Finally, the Committee recalls that this approach does not resonate with an understanding of the challenges and prejudice that the Roma community continues to face in the State party, as established in the Committee’s concluding 16 17 18 19 8 See, for example, V.S. v. Slovakia (CERD/C/88/D/56/2014), para. 7.4; Er v. Denmark (CERD/C/71/D/40/2007), para. 7.4; and Laurent Gabre Gabroum v. France (CERD/C/89/D/52/2012), para. 7.2. Art. 19 of Law No. 121 on equality. See the Committee’s general recommendation No. 8 (1990). See the Committee’s general recommendation No. 32 (2009), para. 7.