CERD/C/103/D/60/2016 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, pursuant to article 14 (7) (a) of the Convention, whether the communication is admissible. 7.2 The Committee notes that the petitioner submitted his communication to the Committee on 30 June 2016, that is, within six months of the date of service of the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice, which took place on 22 January 2016. The Committee further notes that the State party has not contested the admissibility of the complaint on this ground, and it therefore considers that the petitioner has complied with the six-month requirement under article 14 (5) of the Convention. 7.3 Furthermore, as per rule 91 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee is to ascertain that the communication is compatible with the provisions of the Convention. In this respect, the Committee notes that the facts of the case took place in November 2012, that is, before the entry into force of article 14 for the State party on 8 May 2013. However, the Committee notes that the decisions of the domestic courts were handed down on 27 June 2014, 22 January 2015 and 16 September 2015. The Committee concurs with the position of other committees that judicial decisions of the national authorities are to be considered as part of the facts of the case when they are the result of procedures directly connected with the initial facts, actions or omissions that gave rise to the violation, provided they are capable of remedying the alleged violation. If such decisions are adopted after the entry into force of article 14 for the State party concerned, the criterion provided for in rule 91 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure will not affect the admissibility of the communication, since, when these remedies are exercised, the national courts have the possibility of considering the complaints, putting an end to the alleged violations and potentially providing redress. 14 In any event, in the present case, the violations claimed by the petitioner seem to largely relate to the deficiencies of the remedies provided by the State party, namely the examination of the petitioner’s discrimination claim by the civil courts and the subsequent judicial decisions delivered in 2014 and 2015, which failed to apply anti-discrimination standards and perpetuated his allegedly unlawful treatment by a private employer. 15 In this respect, the Committee takes note of the fact that the civil proceedings initiated by the petitioner allowed the national courts to examine in detail the evidence available on file and consider the alleged violations, with a view to providing redress if appropriate. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee cannot declare the communication inadmissible under rule 91 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. 7.4 Lastly, the Committee notes the State party’s assertion that the petitioner has not exhausted all available remedies as he has failed to submit an extraordinary appeal against the decision of the Criminal Panel of the Supreme Court of Justice. In this respect, the Committee is mindful of the petitioner’s argument that it was not the Criminal Panel but the Civil Panel of the Supreme Court of Justice that ruled on his case and that the extraordinary appeal the State party refers to is available only in criminal cases. The Committee observes that the petitioner’s statement is supported by the court documents on file, and therefore 14 15 6 See, for example, the decisions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in M.L.B. v. Luxembourg (E/C.12/66/D/20/2017), para 7.2; S.C. and G.P. v. Italy (E/C.12/65/D/22/2017), para. 6.6; Arellano Medina v. Ecuador (E/C.12/63/D/7/2015), para. 8.3; Trujillo Calero v. Ecuador (E/C.12/63/D/10/2015), para. 9.5; Alarcón Flores et al. v. Ecuador (E/C.12/62/D/14/2016), para. 9.8; Martins Coelho v. Portugal (E/C.12/61/D/21/2017), para. 4.2; C.A.P.M. v. Ecuador (E/C.12/58/D/3/2014), para. 7.4; and I.D.G. v. Spain (E/C.12/55/D/2/2014), para. 9.3. See also the decisions of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Jungelin v. Sweden (CRPD/C/12/D/5/2011), para. 7.6; and Bacher v. Austria (CRPD/C/19/D/26/2014), paras. 8.4–8.7; and the decisions of the Human Rights Committee in Kouidis v. Greece (CCPR/C/86/D/1070/2002), para 6.3; and Singarasa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001), para. 6.3. See, mutatis mutandis, Durmic v. Serbia and Montenegro (CERD/C/68/D/29/2003), para. 6.4.