CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 argument regarding a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, since it was not brought before the trial judge and contains additional factual evidence, is new and thus inadmissible”. The author then lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, which informed her by letter of 11 September 2014 that her application was inadmissible. 4.3 The State party recalls the reservation related to article 5 (2) (a) that it entered upon ratifying the Optional Protocol. 11 It recalls the Committee’s practice of not considering a matter as having been “examined” by another international body if the case has been dismissed on purely procedural grounds. Conversely, a decision of inadmissibility based on even a very limited, or implicit, consideration of the merits of a complaint constitutes an examination within the meaning of article 5 (2) (a).12 4.4 In the present case, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights addressed to the author declaring her application inadmissible does not cite the grounds for inadmissibility. However, articles 34–35 of the European Convention on Human Rights set out six grounds for inadmissibility: (a) if the six-month period for the submission of the application is exceeded, as counted from the date on which the final domestic decision is taken; (b) if the complaint is anonymous; (c) if the matter has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement; (d) if domestic remedies have not been exhausted; (e) if the application is manifestly ill-founded or an abuse; and (f) if the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage. 4.5 Given that the application was submitted within six months, not anonymously and exclusively to the European Court of Human Rights, and also that the alleged disadvantage was significant within the meaning of article 34 of the Convention, the State party considers that it follows implicitly, but also necessarily, that the application could only have been rejected by the Court for failure to exhaust domestic remedies or because it was considered to be manifestly ill-founded or an abuse. 4.6 In the first of those scenarios, the Committee can only reach the same conclusion as the European Court of Human Rights, since it was in cassation that the author for the first time invoked the complaint of a violation of articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant. Consequently, as it did in the Bikramjit Singh case in relation to article 17, the Committee should declare the application inadmissible owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 4.7 In the second scenario, if the European Court of Human Rights has rejected an application that it considers manifestly ill-founded, then it must have carried out an examination of the claims put forward by the applicants, which means that it has reviewed the merits of the case. That too would leave the Committee without jurisdiction, because of the reservation filed by France. 4.8 According to the State party, the argument that the case before the Committee is not the same case cannot be accepted. The communication relates to the same facts and the same circumstances as the application submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. What is more, the issues raised are the same. 4.9 The Committee has already indicated that the condition requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies has not been met, as it was in cassation that the author first put forward the claim invoked before the Committee. Those grounds were declared inadmissible by the highest domestic court because they had not been invoked before the ordinary court. 13 4.10 The author was duly summoned to the hearing and was in a position to seek the assistance of counsel for her defence, which she did not do; indeed, she chose not to attend the hearing. She cannot use her own failings as an argument. In conclusion, the Committee should declare the communication inadmissible. 11 12 13 6 Upon ratification, France entered the following reservation: “France makes a reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), specifying that the Human Rights Committee shall not have competence to consider a communication from an individual if the same matter is being examined or has already been considered under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.” The State party refers to Wdowiak v. Poland (CCPR/C/88/D/1446/2006), para. 6.2. The State party refers to Bikramjit Singh v. France, para. 7.4.