CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 Committee must therefore decide whether the differential treatment of the author, who wears the full Islamic veil, with regard to other forms of face covering authorized under the exceptions established by article 2 of the Act meets the criteria of reasonableness, objectivity and legitimacy of the aim. 7.15 The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any explanation as to why the blanket prohibition on the author’s veil is reasonable or justified, in contrast to the exceptions allowable under the Act.35 The Committee further notes that the blanket ban on the full-face veil introduced by the Act appears to be based on the assumption that the fullface veil is inherently discriminatory and that women who wear it are forced to do so. While acknowledging that some women may be subject to family or social pressures to cover their faces, the Committee observes that the wearing of the full-face veil can also be a choice – or even a means of staking a claim – based on a religious belief, as in the author’s case.36 The Committee further considers that the ban, far from protecting fully veiled women, could have the opposite effect of confining them to the home, impeding their access to public services and exposing them to abuse and marginalization. Indeed, the Committee has previously stated its concern that the Act’s ban on face coverings in public places infringes the freedom to express one’s religion or belief, has a disproportionate impact on the members of specific religions and on girls, and that the Act’s effect on certain groups’ feelings of exclusion and marginalization could run counter to the intended goals.37 The Committee further notes that a separate provision of the Act, article 225-4-10 of the Criminal Code, criminalizes the serious offence of forcing an individual to conceal the face and thus specifically addresses that stated concern. 7.16 Finally, although the State party contends that the sanctions imposed on women who decide to wear the full veil in public are “measured”, the Committee notes that the penalties have a criminal nature and have been applied against some women on multiple occasions. Such sanctions necessarily negatively affect the author’s right to manifest her religion by wearing the veil and potentially other rights. 7.17 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the criminal ban introduced by article 1 of the Act disproportionately affects the author as a Muslim woman who chooses to wear the full-face veil and introduces a distinction between her and other persons who may legally cover their face in public that is not necessary and proportionate to a legitimate interest and is therefore unreasonable. The Committee hence concludes that this provision and its application to the author constitutes a form of intersectional discrimination based on gender and religion, in violation of article 26 of the Covenant. 8. The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of the author’s rights under articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant. 9. Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, inter alia, to provide the author with appropriate measures of satisfaction, including financial compensation, for the harm suffered. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future, including by reviewing Act No. 2010-1192 in the light of its obligations under the Covenant, in particular, under articles 18 and 26 thereof.38 10. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a 35 36 37 38 See, in this regard, C and R v Australia (CCPR/C/119/D/2216/2012), para. 8.6. In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights has found that “a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women – such as the applicant – in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms” (S.A.S. v. France, para. 139). CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5, para. 22. Ibid. 13