CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 fundamental rights or freedoms of others that are affected by the fact that some people present in the public space have their face covered, including fully veiled women. Nor has the State party explained why such rights would be “unfairly” obstructed by wearing the full-face veil, but not by covering the face in public through the numerous other means that are exempted from the Act. The right to interact with any person in a public space and the right not to be disturbed by the fact that someone is wearing the full-face veil are not protected by the Covenant and cannot therefore constitute permissible restrictions within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. 7.11 Even assuming that the concept of coexistence could be considered a “legitimate objective” within the meaning of article 18 (3), the State party has not demonstrated that the criminal ban on certain means of covering the face in public spaces, which is a significant restriction of the rights and freedoms of the author as a Muslim woman who wears the fullface veil, is proportionate to that objective or that it is the least restrictive means that is protective of freedom of religion or belief. 7.12 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the State party has not demonstrated that the limitation of the author’s freedom to manifest her religion or belief by wearing the niqab was necessary and proportionate within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the ban introduced by the Act and the author’s conviction under that Act for wearing the niqab violated her rights under article 18 of the Covenant. 7.13 As regards the author’s claims under article 26 of the Covenant, that the Act in question constituted indirect discrimination against the minority of Muslim women who wear the full-face veil, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the ban introduced by the Act is not based on the religious connotations of the item of clothing in question but rather on the fact that it conceals the face. According to the State party, only “the most radical form of clothing that makes the person invisible in public” would be affected and, as a result, the author could access public space wearing a headscarf, which would manifest her religious beliefs without concealing her face. The Committee notes, however, that the National Assembly, in its resolution on the commitment to uphold republican values in the face of the development of radical practices that undermine them, considered that radical practices detrimental to human dignity and equality between men and women, including the wearing of a full-face veil, were contrary to the values of the Republic and that it would like the fight against discrimination and the promotion of equality between men and women to be priorities of public policy. The Committee further observes that the Act, despite being drafted in general terms, includes exceptions for most contexts of face covering in public, thus limiting the applicability of the ban to little more than the full Islamic veil and that the Act has been primarily enforced against women wearing the full-face veil. Hence, from the text of the Act, the debate preceding its adoption and its implementation in practice, the Committee observes that the Act is applied mainly to the full-face Islamic veil, which is a form of religious observance and identification for a minority of Muslim women. 7.14 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993), in which it viewed with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they represented religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious community. 30 A violation of article 26 may result from the discriminatory effect of a rule or measure that is apparently neutral or lacking any intention to discriminate.31 The Committee also recalls that regulations that govern the clothing to be worn by women in public may involve a violation of a number of rights guaranteed by the Covenant, such as article 26, on non-discrimination.32 Yet, not every differentiation based on the grounds listed in article 26 amounts to discrimination, as long as it is based on reasonable and objective criteria, 33 in pursuit of an aim that is legitimate under the Covenant. 34 The 30 31 32 33 34 12 Ibid., para. 2. Althammer et al. v. Austria (CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001), para. 10.2. General comment No. 28 (2000), para. 13. See, for example, Broeks v. Netherlands, communication No. 172/1984, para. 13; and Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, communication No. 182/1984, para. 13. See, for example, O’Neill and Quinn v. Ireland (CCPR/C/87/D/1314/2004), para. 8.3.