A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 page 13 harm to persons exclusively, rather than harm to property. So-called cultural genocide, or ethnocide, i.e. genocide aimed at destroying the language, religion or culture of a group, does not appear to be taken into consideration, despite the fact that it might be the most intense manifestation of the crime of genocide.44 43. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia makes no reference to the concept of “cultural genocide” anywhere in the definition of genocide contained in article 4 of its Statute, or in its characterizations or interpretations of the crime of genocide. There is nevertheless a feeling that the idea is taking hold in the Karadzic and Mladic case where the Tribunal makes several references to it: the bill of indictment45 speaks of physical, political, legal and cultural genocide (note 58, p. 21, para. 44), systematic destruction of sacred sites (p. 6, para. 11), the virtually systematic destruction of Muslim and Catholic cultural property (p. 8, para. 15) and the desire to annihilate religious services and rites (p. 19, para. 41). The Tribunal even refers to the killing of memory and a policy of ethnic cleansing aimed at eradicating memory (p. 61, para. 94; p. 35, para. 60). The Tribunal also states that the widespread and systematic destruction of houses of worship destroyed, traumatized or dehumanized most aspects of life in the Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities in the regions over which the Bosnian Serbs gained control (p. 9, paras. 30 and 31). 44. This is in no way an attempt to place aggravated discrimination, the subject of our study, on the same footing as cultural genocide. In any event, the possibility of exclusively cultural destruction remains an exception. As Verhoeven notes, “in many cases, ethnocide is merely the ‘cultural’ aspect of genocide proper, which should suffice in order for it to be punished”.46 However, when it is repetitive and, of course, reaches a certain magnitude, aggravated discrimination, whether by the State or individuals,47 borders on cultural genocide or genocide proper. In any event, even if the comparison is considered to be inappropriate and unjustified, this is all the more reason why such discrimination cannot be given the same treatment as discrimination on separate grounds. It may rightfully be argued that genocide requires an intent to commit genocide on the part of the perpetrator. Here, too, the problem is far from simple, and the solution proposed confirms the idea of a special regime for governing, on a common sense basis, discrimination against persons identified with more than one group. 45. There can be no genocide without the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group [...] as such”. As H. Donnedieu de Vabres has noted, “the theory of genocide [...] is therefore a derogation from ordinary law, because it encompasses the motive in the legal constitution of the offence”.48 The problem is whether the intent to commit genocide is sufficient, or whether a quantitative threshold is also required in order for the elements constituting the offence to be present. Although it is true that the relevant instruments set no quantitative threshold, the concept of group appears to be an integral part of the definition of genocide.49 The very nature of the crime implies the will to destroy a significant proportion of the group [Whitaker, 1985; Ternon, 1995].50 46. However, the opposite argument can also be made. In a system where intent plays a decisive role, “What matters” - as Verhoeven writes51 - “is the perpetrator of the crime rather than the number of victims”. As the decisive factor is the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part, the number of victims is not an element constituting the offence [Verhoeven, 1991].52 Consequently, there is nothing to prohibit a crime being characterized as genocide, even if it has