A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 page 6 13. However, as Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, rightly observed in his famous 1979 study: “If, however, the problem is examined without political prejudice and from a truly universal point of view, there can be no gainsaying that the essential elements of the concept of a minority are well known, and that the only point at issue as far as the definition is concerned is whether an indisputable objective ‘core’ can be widened or restricted by means of a few controversial considerations” [E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para. 564].11 14. Several definitions of minority have been proposed around this core; most of them use cumulative criteria of an objective and subjective nature. Capotorti’s definition is particularly interesting; according to it, a minority is “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” [E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para. 568]. 15. Other experts, generally members of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, have proposed similar definitions. Worthy of mention are those by Jules Deschênes in 1985 [E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31],12 Asbjørn Eide in 199413 and Stanislav Tchernichenko in 1997 [cited in Yacoub, 1998].14 Mention should also be made of the definition of the Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion of 31 July 1930, from which the definitions of the above-mentioned legal writers seem to be drawn [“The Greco-Bulgarian ‘communities’”].15 None of these definitions has been found to be satisfactory [Andrysek, 1989],16 which has much less to do with the appropriateness of the definitions proposed than with obstacles of a political or even psychological nature and to an unjustified fear of the risks of separatism. 16. International law habitually protects rights without requiring general agreement on a definition of the beneficiaries of the protection. The best example of this is the right of peoples to self-determination. The lack of a definition in the international conventions where the term “minority” is used (including article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights) has not prevented the bodies set up under these conventions from settling disputes involving minorities. In any case, the criteria proposed overlap considerably. The subjective criteria (sense of solidarity and determination to preserve their distinctive religious and cultural characteristics) are implicit in the objective criteria (existence of a group or a community that is distinct and non-dominant in numerical terms, having common ethnic and religious characteristics). In other words, such a definition, even if not enshrined in positive law,17 can easily be applied to persons belonging to religious minorities who suffer from racial discrimination. 17. The minorities we are studying here, the “national” or “identity” minorities - as distinct from other minorities based on other criteria (homosexual, vegetarian, disabled, political, etc., who are not covered by international conventions) - are generally divided into three categories: ethnic, religious and linguistic; international instruments dealing specifically with minorities agree on these three criteria [Malinverni, 1991].18 However, these three categories or criteria are far from mutually exclusive. For our purposes, several religious minorities are at the same time ethnic and/or linguistic minorities. These differences from the rest of the population normally