A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 page 12 modelled on the Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are of relatively minor interest although their general spirit is far from unfavourable to the overlap between race and religion. (a) Explicit recognition (i) Instruments protecting groups 40. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948, is of essential importance to our work. Article II of the Convention defines genocide as an act committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. Article 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, established on 22 February 1993, and article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998, reproduce this definition.38 It is obvious that the crime of genocide may crystallize the overlap between race and religion in the most “odious” way (Convention, third preambular paragraph). Unlike crimes against humanity, genocide, even if perpetrated against individuals, aims at destroying the very foundations of a human entity or ethnic and religious group.39 “[...] genocide [...] is a crime under international law” (Convention, art. I); it “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity [...] and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations”.40 History has shown that when genocide is perpetrated, it is aimed at a group's total identity, i.e. at causing it bodily or mental harm (Convention, art. II (b)). The word “mental” reflects in itself the most criminal form of aggravated discrimination. The episodes of “ethnic cleansing” committed throughout the history of humanity were intended to harm both the racial, religious and cultural identity of a group or people, at times its very physical existence. It is therefore not possible to dissociate them. 41. Developments in the concept of the crime of genocide as reflected in the recent case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia deserve a few comments in connection with the subject at hand. Three elements must occur together in order for genocide to exist:41 (a) instruments; (b) A material element, in the form of the criminal acts listed in the above-mentioned A moral element: an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group [...] as such”; (c) An element ratione personae: genocide must be aimed at a “national, ethnical, racial or religious”42 group. 42. As far as the subject of our study is concerned, the problem arises in cross-interpreting these elements, which is not as easy as it might appear. The crime of genocide remains an ambiguous concept [Verhoeven, 1991; Castillo, 1994].43 And it is precisely this ambiguity that requires an attentive analysis, making due allowances, with regard to aggravated discrimination. First, as regards the material element, the relevant instruments on genocide address, in principle,