A/HRC/26/49 secure online environment. In 2007, the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council made a recommendation to seek a joint approach on cybercrime-related issues by taking into consideration international standards. In 2009, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a directive on fighting cybercrime in the ECOWAS region that provided a legal framework for its member States. In 2012, the East African Community adopted a framework for cyberlaw, which provided an overview of the legal issues relating to intellectual property, competition, taxation and information security. 38. In 2004, the Organization of American States (OAS) implemented the InterAmerican Integral Strategy to Combat Threats to Cyber Security, the main objectives of which were to establish national “alert, watch and warning” groups, known as Computer Security Incident Response Teams, in each country, to create a hemispheric watch and warning network providing guidance and support to cybersecurity technicians from around the Americas, and to promote a culture and awareness of cybersecurity for the region. Other initiatives by OAS include the Inter-American Cooperation Portal on Cyber-Crime and the meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas, which are aimed at strengthening hemispheric cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of cybercriminality. More recently, in 2013, OAS and the Latin American and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry signed a cybersecurity agreement to strengthen the development of the ties among Governments, the private sector and civil society in the Americas, thus ensuring a multidimensional approach to cybersecurity. 39. Although the above-mentioned initiatives include specific computer-related crimes involving incitement to racial hatred and violence, the majority of them do not specifically address content-related offences, such as the dissemination of racist ideas or incitement to racial hatred and violence on the Internet and social media, focusing rather on other forms of cybercrime and cybersecurity concerns. 3. Legal and regulatory frameworks taken at the national level and by Internet and social media providers 40. The issues of racism and incitement to racial hatred and violence on the Internet and social media have been addressed not only through national frameworks but also through different initiatives taken by Internet service providers and social media platforms. The Special Rapporteur has identified three main models emerging from the different frameworks and initiatives: the censorship model; the regulatory framework; and the freedom of speech approach. 41. Internet and social media censorship consists of suppressing information and ideas in order to “protect” society from “reprehensible” ideas. States are able to censor Internet content through various means, such as by setting up agencies to monitor the Internet and deciding what to censor according to established norms. This can also be achieved, by both States and Internet and social media providers, by programing Internet routers to block or censor the flow of specific data from Internet servers to service providers, and therefore to Internet and social media users. Moreover, when “objectionable” information is posted online, States can promptly demand that the Internet provider or social media platform remove it. In order to be effective, this type of censorship requires States to have extremely efficient systems in place to track and survey posted content and then to quickly remove it. Internet providers or social media platforms themselves may also achieve this goal, although with a lesser degree of efficiency. 42. The Special Rapporteur believes that while censorship does not necessarily need to serve illegitimate ends and can be used to suppress racially hateful speech, there are significant drawbacks. Censorship policies can have a chilling effect, as users who know that their online activities are screened by a government agency are less inclined to engage in freedom of expression. Users can be further deterred if they are unsure whether the 11

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