CCPR/C/132/D/2552/2015 Annex I [Original: English] Joint opinion of Committee members Arif Bulkan, Vasilka Sancin and Hélène Tigroudja (concurring) 1. We fully concur with the Views of the Committee and consider that the facts disclose a violation of articles 17 and 27 of the Covenant. The protracted pollution and extensive use of pesticides by agrochemical companies for soyabean cultivation have harsh consequences. 1 They have a dramatic impact on the way of life of vulnerable groups and, especially, of indigenous communities, as illustrated in the Views to which the present opinion is annexed. 2. We regret, however, that one of the main issues at stake in this case, in other words the consequences of the pollution on the right to life (art. 6 of the Covenant), was not raised by the parties or proprio motu by the Committee. As highlighted by the Committee in its general comment No. 36 (2019), the right to life should not be interpreted narrowly; moreover, it encompasses the right to enjoy a life with dignity.2 In that same general comment, and in its Views on Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, the Committee affirmed that the duty to protect life also implies that States parties should take appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society that may give rise to direct threats to life or prevent individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity. These general conditions may include degradation of the environment and the deprivation of the land, territories and resources of indigenous peoples.3 3. The Committee is not alone in having interpreted the right to a dignified life. For more than two decades, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has pioneered the concept of vida digna, which extends the scope of the protection of the right to life beyond the right not to be deprived arbitrarily of life to encompass the right to have “access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence”.4 In other words, States must take the measures necessary to create an adequate normative framework to discourage any threat to the right to life5 and to safeguard that right by protecting access to conditions guaranteeing a dignified life. 6 Indigenous communities’ right to a decent life was developed by the Court in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, wherein it established a close connection between the right to life and economic, social and cultural rights.7 This was reaffirmed by the Court in its Advisory Opinion on the environment and human rights. 8 Crucially, the fact that States have an obligation to ensure minimum living conditions to support human dignity means that the Court has found violations of the right to life even when no one has died. 9 4. Although the authors of the communication at hand have not claimed a violation of their right to a dignified life, it is obvious that the State has breached that right in respect of the authors, some of whom are children. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 16 See also Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay (CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016). General comment No. 36 (2019), para. 3. Ibid., para. 26. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, judgment of 19 November 1999, para. 144. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Luna López v. Honduras, judgment of 10 October 2013, para. 138. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. judgment of 17 April 2015, para. 260. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, judgment of 17 June 2005, para. 163. See also the American Convention on Human Rights, art. 26. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 15 November 2017, para. 48. Jo M. Pasqualucci, “The right to a dignified life (vida digna): the integration of economic and social rights with civil and political rights in the inter-American human rights system”, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1–32. GE.22-15010