E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.2 page 37 according to the patrilineal order, whereby all ascendants or descendants of the mother were excluded from the right to inherit.203 Here again, where religious prescriptions appear quite specific, the influence of cultural or customary practices or affirmative action by the State or individuals can allow a different reading of a religious text and lead to practices that are either even more discriminatory or aimed at reducing discrimination in this area. 144. In some cultures, therefore, within a context bounded by religion-based rules, which, it should be noted, do not extend beyond rules of apportionment (surah 4, verses 11, 12 and 13), women are debarred from owning property, in particular agricultural property. To prevent assets from being divided up, male heirs alone are entitled to shares of land and compensate wives and daughters with movable assets or other goods. Such informal methods of exclusion conflict with religious prescriptions, even under unequal laws.204 In some countries, women reportedly continue to be deprived of the right of inheritance by reference to local customs and ancient colonial laws which negate rights granted by their religion.205 Religion is thus abandoned in favour of discriminatory customs. 145. Also, the institution of the endowment system of habous or waqf has made it possible in some Muslim countries to tie up property, in particular landed estate, and this has been employed to circumvent Koranic prescriptions in order, inter alia, to disinherit women under cover of religious legality and unity of land assets. By precisely using the religious argument of women’s right in matters of inheritance, some States have abolished habous endowments.206 146. State practice can, however, construe religious prescriptions in a positive manner and mitigate inheritance discrimination against women without challenging beliefs or opposing rules laid down in holy texts. Two examples warrant specific mention: (a) Through technical provisions incorporated in substantive law, a State can rectify excessive aspects of discrimination based on Sharia. In the Tunisian Personal Status Code, for example, article 143 bis, which was added on 19 June 1959, states: “Whenever, in the absence of agnatic heirs (asaba), the estate is not fully absorbed by the obligatory heirs (fardh), the residue reverts to the latter and is divided among them in proportion to their shares. The daughter or daughters and granddaughter of the paternal line ad infinitum shall benefit from reversion of the surplus, even if there are asaba heirs in their own right or in the category of brothers, paternal uncles and their descendants, and notwithstanding the Treasury”. This provision thus appears to favour women, including wives, in two ways. First, it removes the public treasury, which figured as an agnatic heir with precedence over female fardh heirs. Secondly, it recognizes the precedence of daughters over collateral heirs even if they are male (paternal uncle, his son, etc.) and protects the reduced family, formerly a prerogative of sons and grandsons.207 Therefore, as with religion at the time of its revelation, substantive law can follow a positive and affirmative approach in interpreting religious laws and rectify aspects of them in line with changes in society and custom, with a view to halting, or at least limiting, the discrimination suffered by women through religion. (b) Despite religious prescriptions, the substantive law of some countries allows gifts to be made or property to be bequeathed by a man during his lifetime in equal shares between his male and female children or to a non-Muslin wife.208 The State can play a role in this respect through tax incentives and by not imposing heavy duties on transactions of this kind, whose purpose is to re-establish gender equality.