E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.2 page 15 50. Unlike in other instruments or mandates, no practice is given prominence and most, as will be seen, are based on or imputed to religion. The Committee also recognizes, from the first paragraphs of the general comment, that “inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes” (para. 5). This approach is new since not only is it a departure from the abstract concept of equality, as already referred to, but there is also a determination no longer to accept the discriminatory aspects of social norms derived from our cultural and religious heritage. Moreover, in accordance with its constructive jurisprudence, the Committee acknowledges that inequality within the formal context of article 3 of the Covenant goes beyond the rights expressly provided for in the Covenant since the right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law, as provided for by article 26 of the Covenant, are breached. Bearing in mind this jurisprudence and the contents of general comment 28, discrimination against women that is based on or imputed to religion thus falls under the Committee’s mandate. 51. Other specific instruments are also concerned with women’s status in the light of religious traditions, although their protection mechanisms are not as well developed. This is the case with the instruments on slavery. 2. Instruments relating to slavery 52. On the basis of the definition of slavery set forth in the Slavery Convention of 1926 and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956, it has to be acknowledged that some traditional practices affecting women’s status may be regarded as equivalent to this severe form of infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. From a combination of article 1 of both conventions, slavery can be seen to be the condition of persons over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised or of persons of servile status, including that of debt bondage or serfdom. As to types of servitude, the Supplementary Convention of 1956 specifies situations involving institutions or practices whereby “a woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person” (art. 1 (c) (iii)), or “a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by … his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to [his] exploitation” (art. 1 (d)), or a woman is given in marriage without her consent “on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person” (art. 1 (c) (i)). It will be seen in the factual part of the present study that many instances of traditional practices based on religion are comparable to these situations and must therefore be treated as such. 53. Also, in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, slavery involving in particular women and children for purposes of sexual exploitation is deemed a crime against humanity. 54. The Special Rapporteur on the suppression of the traffic in persons and the exploitation of the prostitution of others chose to take the human rights approach to analysing the issue of prostitution and, from that perspective, he, like the Commission on Human Rights, considered prostitution “to be a form of slavery”.43 That is especially true in the case of enforced prostitution, which, as will be seen, is not always associated with financial gain but can be linked to factors imputed to religion. Sexual slavery in all cases constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights guarantees.