CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996 Page 9 Author’s comments 5.1 Counsel submits that the State party has admitted the discriminatory nature of the educational funding, and based this on a constitutional obligation. Counsel argues that article 26 of the Covenant does not allow exceptions for discriminatory constitutional laws and that historical anomalies cannot thwart the application of the equality provisions of the Covenant. Counsel rejects as circular the State party’s argument that the difference between the funding of Roman Catholic schools and other religious schools is one between public and private schools. Counsel notes that the public quality of Roman Catholic schools is a bureaucratic construct assigned to one group of ratepayers based on their religious affiliation to the discriminatory exclusion of all other ratepayers. 5.2 Counsel rejects the State party’s argument that the extension of nondiscriminatory public funding to other religious schools would harm the goals of a tolerant, multi-cultural, non-discriminatory society, and argues that on the contrary, the current circumstance of discriminatory and selective funding of only one religious denomination in the establishment and operation of religious schools is highly detrimental to fostering a tolerant, nondiscriminatory society in the province and encourages the divided society among religious lines that it claims to defeat. 5.3 According to counsel, the State party’s argument that the claim under article 18 is inadmissible ratione materiae because article 18 does not include a right to require the State to fund public schools, is a misrepresentation of the author’s submissions. Counsel argues that article 18(1) includes the right to teach religion and the right to educate one’s children in a religious school. If this is possible for some and not for others on discriminatory grounds, then article 18 is violated in conjunction with article 2. According to counsel, in order to give article 2 its full and proper meaning, it must have the effect of requiring non-discrimination on the listed grounds with respect to the rights and freedoms in the Covenant, even if in the absence of discrimination, no violation of the Covenant existed. If a violation of the Covenant was always required without the application or consideration of article 2, article 2 would be superfluous, in counsel’s opinion.7 Counsel clarifies that he does not claim a violation of article 18 on its own, but only in conjunction with article 2, because the funding of only Roman Catholic schools results in discriminatory support for Roman Catholic education. 5.4 According to counsel, the State party makes the same error in replying to his claims under article 27 in conjunction with article 2. He argues that, since Roman Catholic schools are the only religious minority to receive full and direct funding for religious education from the Government of Ontario, article 27 has not been applied, as required by article 2, without distinction on the basis of religion. 7 Counsel refers to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which recognizes that a measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the article enshrining the right or freedom in question may however infringe this article when read in conjunction with article 14 for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature. (Judgement of 23 July 1968, relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium)