CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996 Page 14 Appendix Individual opinion by member Martin Scheinin (concurring) While I concur with the Committee's finding that the author is a victim of a violation of article 26 of the Covenant, I wish to explain my reasons for such a conclusion. 1. The Covenant does not require the separation of church and state, although countries that do not make such a separation often encounter specific problems in securing their compliance with articles 18, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. Varying arrangements are in place in states parties to the Covenant, ranging from full separation to the existence of a constitutionally enforced state church. As the Committee has expressed in its General Comment No. 22 [48] on article 18, the fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, "shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers" (para. 9). 2. The plurality of acceptable arrangements in the relationship between state and religion relates also to education. In some countries, all forms of religious instruction or observance are prohibited in public schools, and religious education, protected under article 18 (4), takes place either outside school hours or in private schools. In some other countries there is religious education in the official or majority religion in public schools, with provision for full exemption for adherents of other religions and non-religious persons. In a third group of countries instruction in several or even all religions is offered, on the basis of demand, within the public system of education. A fourth arrangement is the inclusion in public school curricula of neutral and objective instruction in the general history of religions and ethics. All these arrangements allow for compliance with the Covenant. As was specifically stated in the Committee's General Comment No. 22 [48], "public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18 (4) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians" (para. 6). This statement reflects the Committee's findings in the case of Hartikainen et al. v. Finland (Communication No. 40/1978). 3. In the present case the Committee correctly focussed its attention on article 26. Although both General Comment No. 22 [48] and the Hartikainen case are related to article 18, there is a considerable degree of interdependence between that provision and the non-discrimination clause in article 26. In general, arrangements in the field of religious education that are in compliance with article 18 are likely to be in conformity with article 26 as well, because nondiscrimination is a fundamental component in the test under article 18 (4). In the cases of Blom v. Sweden (Communication No. 191/1985) and Lundgren et al. and Hjord et al. v. Sweden (Communications 288 and 299/1988) the Committee elaborated its position in the question what constitutes discrimination in the field of education. While the Committee left open whether the Covenant entails, in certain situations, an obligation to provide some public funding for private schools, it concluded that the fact that private schools, freely chosen by the parents and their children, do not receive the same level of funding as public schools does not amount to discrimination.