E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.1 page 24 unless a law is specifically targeted at a religious practice or infringes upon an additional constitutional right. The religious communities feel that they are thus vulnerable in the face of legislation and political and administrative institutions governed by a conception of the separation of religion and the State which requires that everyone must comply with the same rules and regulations, and which hence regards any request from religions that their specific nature should be respected in their rights and freedoms as a request for privileges. Secondly, concerning the clause on “non-establishment” of religion, the Supreme Court's interpretation, particularly with regard to public aid for religion, recognition of religion in State schools and financial aid given by the Government to religious schools, unfortunately appears from a general viewpoint to be vague and confused, as was stated, incidentally, by members of the Supreme Court. According to John Witte, professor at Emory University in Atlanta, the development of a coherent and comprehensive framework for interpreting and applying the two constitutional religion clauses would be most useful. That unified approach could come in a variety of forms - through grand synthetic cases or through comprehensive statutes, restatements, codes, or even constitutional amendments (“The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment”, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 71, No. 3, 1996). The Special Rapporteur wholly endorses the approach of taking into account the traditions of other peoples as reflected in the main United Nations human rights instruments, namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 18 and General Comment No. 22 of the Human Rights Committee; see paragraph 78 below) and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. For example, the prioritizing of liberty of conscience, free exercise and equality principles might well serve as a prototype for the integration of the values enshrined in the free exercise and “non-establishment” clauses. This second approach would be a way of correcting the attitude of the United States of America that human rights are to be treated as belonging to international affairs and not as a domestic matter. We may point out here that this attitude was also noted by Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in his report on his mission to the United States of America (E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3). 72. There certainly is federal legislation providing protection in the sphere of religion and belief, but it is fragmentary, only dealing with certain aspects of the freedom of religion and belief and certain infringements of that freedom. As regards, in particular, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, concerning religious practice at the workplace and the employer's obligation to make “reasonable accommodation”, it seems that it has limited effect and that there is a problem of generally restrictive interpretations by the courts in the matter of religion. The Special Rapporteur considers that this legislation needs to be strengthened and hopes that the Religious Freedom in the Workplace Bill and the guidelines for the protection of freedom of religion in federal institutions announced by the Clinton Administration will contribute to that end. In general, the Special Rapporteur considers that in the absence of a consistent and detailed framework within which the two constitutional clauses on “non-establishment” and free exercise of religion could be interpreted and applied, a general law on freedom of religion and belief based on the relevant international human