CCPR/C/139/D/2925/2017 therefore finds that Mr. Beklyaev and Mr. Nesterov failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, and it therefore finds their claims under the Covenant inadmissible. The Committee will therefore examine the present communication only in respect of Mr. Yurlov. 8.5 The Committee notes Mr. Yurlov’s claim that he has exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to him. It also notes the State party’s objection to the admissibility of the communication on the ground that Mr. Yurlov failed to exhaust remedies under articles 323 (4) and 337 (4) of the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure, which, respectively, enable him to seek revision by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or his or her Deputy of a single-judge decision not to remit a cassation or supervisory appeal for consideration by the Presidium of the Supreme Court. In this regard, the Committee notes Mr. Yurlov’s claim that article 323 (4) was not applicable to him. The applicable procedure was that of supervisory review, under article 332 of the Code, since in his case the Supreme Court acted as a second instance (appeal) court. The Committee notes that the State party did not contest Mr. Yurlov’s submission in its additional observations on admissibility submitted on 3 August 2017. Instead, the State party invoked a different article, 337 (4), which sets out the procedure for contesting before the Chief Justice or the Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the single-judge refusal to remit the supervisory review request to the Presidium of the Supreme Court. 8.6 In this regard, the Committee refers to its long-standing jurisprudence that filing requests for supervisory review to the president of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case.13 The Committee notes that the State party provided general statistics concerning the Supreme Court’s supervisory review of administrative and civil cases in 2015 and 2016. The State party does not provide information on the number of cases in which the Chief Justice or Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court reversed a single-judge decision concerning dissolution of a religious organization on the grounds of extremism and sent it to the Presidium of the Supreme Court for consideration. In the light of the information before it, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication, brought in part by Mr. Yurlov. 8.7 The Committee notes Mr. Yurlov’s claim that he has been a victim of degrading treatment because, by dissolvting the Elista local religious organization, the court equated his religious beliefs with a criminal activity, causing him shame, humiliation and indignity. The Committee also notes Mr. Yurlov’s claim that he will be exposed to treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant if he continues his religious activities after the dissolution of the Elista organization, since he will be at risk of administrative and criminal prosecution for such activities. The Committee notes, in that regard, that the aim of article 7 is to protect the physical and mental integrity of the individual.14 Although there is no clear definition of “torture” in the Covenant, the Committee’s interpretation of torture and ill-treatment does not cover the elements invoked by Mr. Yurlov. In the absence of further information on file, the Committee finds Mr. Yurlov’s claims under article 7 insufficiently substantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8.8 The Committee notes that Mr. Yurlov has sufficiently substantiated his claims under articles 18 (1) and (3), 22 (1) and (2), 26 and 27 of the Covenant for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. 13 14 GE.24-00304 Kostenko v. Russian Federation, para. 6.3; and Shchiryakova et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2911/2016, CCPR/C/137/D/3081/2017, CCPR/C/137/D/3137/2018, CCPR/C/137/D/3150/2018), para. 6.3. See also Dorofeev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/111/D/2041/2011), para. 9.6. General comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, para. 2. 9