CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 page 6 filed his claim. It further argues, based on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee,14 that States parties must be accorded a certain “margin of appreciation” in implementing their Convention obligations. 4.8 The State party argues that the use of the term “because of” in section 18 of the Act, requiring a causal relationship between offensive conduct and the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the “targeted group”, is an appropriate manner to implement the obligation to prohibit the intentionally racist acts described in article 4. This is consistent with the Convention and avoids uncertainty. Accordingly, the State party argues that to use “based on” in section 18 of the Act would not give appropriate effect to article 4 of the Convention as implemented in Australian law. 4.9 The State party contends that the petitioner’s complaint was not dismissed on technical grounds, but for lack of substance. The Federal Court, rejecting the contention that any use of the offending term must necessarily be racially offensive, concluded that in the context in which the offending term was used and the community perceptions of the sign on the stand, the decision of the Trust to leave the sign intact did not breach section 18 C of the Act. The State party invites the Committee to adopt the approach of the Federal Court and take into consideration the context in which the word is used in determining issues under article 4. 4.10 The State party refers to the following contextual elements: (i) the fact that the offending term is displayed as “an integral part of the name of a person who is clearly being honoured by having his name publicly attached to the stand”, (ii) the Federal Court’s finding that “[e]ven if the nickname ‘Nigger’ was originally bestowed long ago on Mr. Brown in circumstances in which it then had a racial or even a racist connotation, the evidence indicates that for many decades before the author’s complaint, its use as part of the customary identifier of Mr. Brown had ceased to have any such connotation”, (iii) the consulations with local indigenous persons, (iv) the evidence of a former Aboriginal rugby league personality in the area for whom the name was unproblematic and “simply part of history”, and (v) the absence of any complaint (until the petitioner’s) over 40 years of display at a ground often frequented by many indigenous persons despite increased sensitivities and willingness to speak out in recent years. 4.11 In the light of the above, the State party contends that the Federal Court’s conclusion (upheld on appeal) that the trustees’ refusal, conveyed only after “in good faith [having] taken care to avoid offending the members of a racial group” and which “is not, on an objective view, likely to offend members of that group”, was not an “act done because of the race of” any person. While accepting that the petitioner subjectively felt offended, the Committee should apply an objective test similar to that of the Federal Court in finding that there was no suggestion that the trustees were attempting to justify, promote or incite racial discrimination, contrary to article 4 of the Convention. 4.12 In terms of the specific paragraphs (a) to (c) of article 4, the State party argues that the petitioner has supplied no evidence as to how it may have violated any of these obligations, including that it may be abetting racist activities. It points to Part II A of the Act, which makes unlawful offensive behaviour based on racial hatred, and to further legislation at both State and