CAT/C/78/D/1047/2021 are that the claims concerning conversion were made after the Migration Agency’s decision on expulsion and that the complaint to the Committee raised objections regarding procedural deficiencies during the domestic proceedings as regards those claims. In Q.A. v. Sweden, the Committee, inter alia, held that when an asylum-seeker submits that he or she has become an atheist after his or her initial asylum request has been rejected, it may be reasonable for an in-depth examination of the circumstances of the conversion to be carried out by the authorities. However, regardless of the sincerity of the conversion, the test remains as to whether there are substantial grounds for believing that such a conversion could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin such as to create a real risk of irreparable harm as contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, even when the reported conversion is deemed not sincere, the authorities should proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour and activities of the asylum-seeker in connection with his or her conversion or convictions could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin, putting him or her at risk of irreparable harm.20 The Committee concluded that, owing to the complainant’s intersecting forms of vulnerability, combined with the multiple risk-enhancing factors, he would face serious adverse consequences in the country of origin, which would put him at risk of irreparable harm. The Committee accordingly found that the State party had failed to adequately assess the real, personal and foreseeable risk to the complainant of returning to Afghanistan as a perceived apostate with myriad risk-enhancing factors. 4.13 The complainant in the present case, unlike the complainant in the case of Q.A. v. Sweden, was heard concerning the circumstances of the cited conversion during the national asylum proceedings. The Migration Court further assessed whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the complainant’s cited conversion and activities within the church would have serious adverse consequences in his country of origin such as to create a real risk of irreparable harm as contemplated by article 3. With regard to risk-enhancing factors, the State party notes that the complainant in Q.A. v. Sweden was an individual who had no network in Afghanistan or knowledge of the country. He did not speak fluently either the official or the widely spoken languages of the country. In addition, he had mental health issues, with suicidal ideation, which led him to attempt to commit suicide during the asylum proceedings. The State party notes that the risk-enhancing factors differ between Q.A. v. Sweden and the present case. 4.14 In the present case, the domestic migration authorities also found that the complainant had not plausibly demonstrated that he would be in need of international protection on account of the cited sexual assaults he had been subjected to as a child in Afghanistan. In this regard, the complainant claims that the migration authorities did not investigate those risks in a satisfactory manner and refers to a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of R.C. v. Sweden.21 That case concerns the expulsion to the Islamic Republic of Iran of a man who claimed to have been subjected to torture while detained in an Iranian prison in 2001, following which he left the country illegally. In support of that claim, the applicant had submitted a medical certificate to the national authorities that, according to the Court, gave a strong indication that the applicant’s scars and injuries potentially had been caused by ill-treatment or torture. In the case of R.C. v. Sweden, the Court held that the applicant had made a prima facie case as to the origin of his injuries and had discharged the burden of proving that he had been subjected to torture. It had consequently been for the Migration Agency to dispel any doubts that might have persisted as to the source of the applicant’s injuries. The Court concluded that the authorities had had a duty to ascertain all the facts, particularly in circumstances where there was a strong indication that an applicant’s injuries might have been caused by torture.22 4.15 The State party holds that the present case is clearly distinguishable from that of R.C. v. Sweden, noting that neither the Migration Agency nor the Migration Court found that the complainant had made a prima facie case as to the underlying threat to him and thus the origin of the abuse that he suffered. In contrast, the domestic authorities concluded that the cited 20 21 22 GE.23-24373 Human Rights Committee, Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.5. European Court of Human Rights, R.C. v. Sweden, Application No. 41827/07, Judgment, 9 March 2010. Ibid., para. 53. 7