E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 relevant if it can be shown that such evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary o r amounted to a denial of justice that entailed the violation of a right recognized in the Covenant. 13.2 According to the documentation from the procedure, on 21 June 2012 the Court admitted the application for a procedure to enforce the mortgage on the a uthor’s residence. However, the author only took cognizance of this procedure on 4 April 2013, when she received notification of the order to auction her home, having been unable to defend herself during the enforcement procedure. In September and October 2012 four attempts were made to serve the Court’s decision to admit the application, but to no avail as the author was not at her home — the address of which had been given by her for the purpose of notification. The notifying agent confirmed that the building had a letter box bearing her name; and on at least two occasions the caretaker was in the building. These facts were noted in the records of the Madrid Courts Central Notification and Enforcement Service (see note 3 above) and therefore were or should have been known to the Court. On 30 October 2012, to complete the process of notification of the decision to admit the application, the Court decided to publicly post the notification on the Court notice board, but this did not come to the author ’s attention in time. 13.3 In the present case, the Committee acknowledges the repeated efforts of the Court to personally notify the author of the decision to admit the procedure to enforce the mortgage on her home. However, the Committee considers that the State party has not shown that the Court exhausted all available means to serve notice in person — it does not, for example, explain why the Court did not notify the author by means of a note or advice left in her letter box or any of the other means of notification provided for in the Civil Procedure Act, such as leaving the notice with the caretaker or the nearest neighbour ��� merely stating that after its attempts had failed it ordered notification by public posting of notice in accordance with the law. Nor ha s the State adduced any solid support for its assertion that on one occasion the author hid so as to avoid receiving the notification. Thus the Committee considers that, even if it were to find that the notification by public posting of notice had been car ried out in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act, the fact remains that such notice in respect of a foreclosure application needs to be adequate, in accordance with the standards of the Covenant applicable to the right to housing, as established in para graphs 11.1 to 12.4 above, and that those standards were not met in the present case, which means the notice was inadequate. 13.4 Such an irregularity in the notice procedure might not imply a violation of the right to housing if it had no significant impact on the author’s right to defend her full enjoyment of her home, for example because she had some other appropriate procedural mechanism by which to defend her rights and interests. And that indeed seems to be the State party’s position when it suggests — albeit with no real backing — that the author’s loss of any chance to take part in the enforcement procedure has no serious consequences, because in any case the debtor ’s rights of defence in foreclosure are legally very limited and they actually have ac cess to an ordinary procedure whereby they can mount unlimited challenges to recovery of the mortgage loan. It also argues that, as the author submitted an application under article 695, paragraph 3, of the Civil Procedure Act challenging the validity of c ertain clauses of the mortgage contract and even managed to get the enforcement process and auction suspended, as a result of a recent judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union, then those regular remedies even make it possible to have the en forcement process and the auction of the mortgaged property suspended. 13.5 Given the specificity of the problem of inadequate notice posed by the author, the Committee is not required, in the context of this communication, to consider 14/16 GE.15-17368