A/HRC/46/57/Add.1 council with 33 members from different regions, which, however, due to financial constraints, has not been able to meet for two years. 80. In 2019, the agency’s local reception centres received 200 complaints and took action in 56 cases to ensure that they did not escalate into local interethnic tension and conflict. It is reported that in 2019, a total of 1,011 events and activities to promote interethnic harmony were organized and supervised by the agency, including training programmes and local interethnic diplomacy initiatives. For these activities, the agency also collaborates with the advisory council representing minorities in Kyrgyzstan, the People’s Assembly. 81. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur received criticisms about the efficiency of the agency and of its local reception centres, as local populations are not well informed about the activities of the organization and the possibility of submitting a complaint. In addition, concerns have been raised with regard to the financial sustainability of the agency, which appears to operate mainly thanks to international donors’ contributions. 82. Other concerns are the fact that 20 out of the 23 public reception centres operate in local government buildings, which makes them less accessible to the public, and that the agency’s close coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Muslim religious authorities and the State Committee on National Security signals an association with the ethnic Kyrgyz majority. This creates a feeling of distrust among segments of minority communities, who prefer to refer their cases to human rights civil society organizations and to seek legal assistance where some feel they will receive fairer, more objective treatment. The theme running through many of the concerns expressed was that the agency was not considered able to operate freely as a fair and neutral agency due to limitations by or close association with State authorities in its mandate, operations and resources. 83. In the area of conflict prevention and resolution, and following recent cases of interethnic tension in March and April 2019 over issues of property and business ownership, particularly between members of the ethnic Kyrgyz majority and of the ethnic Uzbek minority, the Office of the Ombudsperson designed and implemented a community-based outreach initiative, involving minority representatives from different regions of the country, who operate as the Ombudsperson’s advisors and are responsible for disseminating information about the Ombudsperson’s activities and recommendations. They contribute to strengthening the local presence of the Office of the Ombudsperson, along with its existing regional offices in the seven regions (oblasts) of the country, monitor interethnic relations, and provide information for any intervention to mitigate local interethnic tensions. 84. However, when the Special Rapporteur visited locations in the south of the country, he was informed that the voices of minorities were muffled because of an environment of threats of “unfinished business” and vulnerability after the violence in 2010 in Osh and surrounding areas. Despite numerous positive and worthwhile initiatives, including with the agency, the Policy Framework on Strengthening National Unity and Interethnic Relations, and the Ombudsperson, a number of United Nations mechanisms have recently expressed concerns similar to those of the Special Rapporteur. 85. After 2010, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for example, referred to what seemed like a growing stereotyping and stigmatization of ethnic minorities, including Uzbeks, Turks, Uighurs and Mugats, and to the use of hate speech against them in the media and by public and political figures. The Committee was also concerned at the ethnic profiling of these communities by law enforcement officers, in particular of Uzbeks. 86. Ethnic profiling, scapegoating and hate speech targeting minorities can even be found in official educational materials. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur was dismayed to see during his visit a history book used for ninth grade students in public schools that teach in Russian. The translation of the relevant section paints the main instigators of the violence in 2010 in Osh as being exclusively Uzbek, despite nearly three quarters of the victims killed during the events being minority Uzbeks themselves. The public school textbook further claims that Uzbeks had been preparing for violence for some time, raising funds “from Uzbek parts of the population of southern regions for the purchase of the weapons”, and that “several Kamaz trucks found in Uzbek neighbourhoods … had been modified for firing weapons”, 14

Select target paragraph3