A/72/365 implementation of programmes on preventing or countering violent extremism, he notes that such programmes must be designed, implemented and promoted so as to avoid any direct or incidental effects that would result in the weakening of the enjoyment of fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of religion or belief. Similarly, governments should do their utmost to ensure that programmes implemented in the name of protecting national security are not, in fact, targeting, stigmatizing or profiling particular religious or belief communities and that they do not have a disproportionate and negative impact on them (see A/HRC/33/29, paras. 31, 45 and 64). The Special Rapporteur also notes, without prejudice, that some human rights groups have expressed serious concerns regarding the lack of transparency surrounding the nature of many programmes on preventing or countering violent extremism, including some of the more well-known ones endorsed and promoted by governments in North America and Western Europe, and have documented violations of the right to non-discrimination, expression, thought and conscience, privacy, education and religion. E. Politicization of religion or belief 43. The politicization of the right to freedom of religion or belief can aggravate existing tensions within civil society communities and between those actors and the State and can increase the risk of intolerance and incitemen t to violence and discrimination based on religion. Politicization of religion refers to its instrumentalization, the use of “religion as a means of shaping and reinforcing narrow concepts of national identity, tapping into feelings of religious belonging for the purposes of strengthening political loyalty”. It can involve any religion and can occur in countries that have adopted an official State religion and those that are formally secular. In many of those situations “religion has been harnessed to promote national unity and societal homogeneity through the invocation of one predominant cultural and/or religious legacy to which all citizens are supposed to relate in a positive manner” (see A/HRC/25/58, para. 27). 44. Indeed, the previous Special Rapporteur, Heiner Bielefeldt, had analysed the root causes of religious hatred and, in particular, the political factors that contribute to the phenomenon: the manifestation of populist discourses, the politics of fea r and aggravating political circumstances, such as endemic corruption, political authoritarianism and the harnessing of religion for narrow identity politics. Such negative factors can lead to a “vicious cycle of mistrust, narrow -mindedness, hysteria, scapegoating and rumours that arouse contempt against certain religious or belief groups”, from which no region is immune (ibid., para. 28). 45. The Special Rapporteur echoes his predecessor’s recommendation that “political and religious leaders, as well as civil society organizations, should actively support and encourage an atmosphere of religious tolerance and help to build societal resilience against manifestations of religious hatred”. Pursuant to the Rabat Plan of Action, these important actors and stakeholders “should refrain from using messages of intolerance or expressions which may incite to religious violence and manifestations of collective religious hatred”, and “speak[ing] out firmly and promptly against intolerance, discriminatory stereotyping and instances of hate speech” (ibid., para. 62). 17-14822 13/24