E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 11.3 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the authors’ claims are manifestly unfounded under article 3 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol, as the authors were not subjected to forced eviction but, rather, were evicted because their rental contract with a private individual had expired, and because their situation had received ongoing attention on the part of the authorities. The Committee considers, nevertheless, that the facts put forward in the communication enable it to assess whether or not there was a violation of the Covenant and that the authors have sufficiently substantiated their claims for purposes of admissibility. 11.4 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of submission because it contains incomplete or distorted information about the situation of the authors, with the intention of misleading the Committee. The Committee considers, however, that the mere discrepancy between the State party’s and the authors’ versions of the facts, including the actions of Social Services and the attitude of Mr. Ben Djazia in his search for a job and alternative housing, does not constitute an abuse of the right to submit a communication under article 3 (2) (f) of the Optional Protocol. 11.5 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible also because it does not indicate that the authors have suffered a clear disadvantage. Under article 4 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee may, if necessary, decline to consider a communication if it does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the Committee considers that the communication raises a serious issue of general importance. A literal and systematic interpretation has led to the conclusion that this provision does not give rise to an admissibility requirement for communications under the Optional Protocol 15 but, rather, gives the Committee the discretionary power not to consider a communication that fails to meet a minimal level of severity if necessary in order to focus its resources on best discharging its functions. This interpretation was confirmed during the development of the Optional Protocol.16 In exercising its discretionary power, the Committee should take into account, among other factors, its jurisprudence on the various rights under the Covenant and whether the alleged victim was at a clear disadvantage on the basis of the circumstances of the case, especially the nature of the rights allegedly violated, the seriousness of the alleged violations and/or the possible effects of the violation on the alleged victim’s personal situation. 17 In the light of these considerations and the facts set forth in the complaint, the Committee does not consider it necessary to decline to consider the communication under article 4 of the Optional Protocol. 11.6 The Committee notes that the communication meets the other admissibility requirements under articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol and, accordingly, declares the communication admissible and proceeds to its consideration on the merits. C. Committee’s consideration of the merits Facts and legal issues 12.1 The Committee has considered the present communication taking into account all the information provided to it in accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the Optional Protocol. 12.2 The authors allege that the State party violated their right to adequate housing given that they were evicted from their rented accommodation by order of Court No. 37, without consideration being given to the fact that they had no alternative housing or to the consequences of the eviction order, in particular for their minor children. They argue that 15 16 17 8 See also rule 14 (5) of the Committee’s provisional rules of procedure. See the report of the Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its fifth session (A/HRC/8/7), paras. 155 and 157. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy, application No. 23563/07, judgment of 6 March 2012, paras. 54–56; and Giusti v. Italy, application No. 13175/03, judgment of 18 October 2011, para. 34. GE.17-12396