A/68/290 2. Criteria for imposing limitations on freedom of religion or belief 46. Measures to eradicate violations of women’s human rights necessarily include State-enforced prohibitions of harmful practices. An extreme example is female genital mutilation, which leads to lifelong and far-reaching health problems, as well as grave forms of traumatization. Whether this practice has religious root causes remains controversial and ultimately doubtful. However, religious leaders may play an important role by clarifying religious views and by publicly calling on their believers to end this cruel practice. 8 The same holds true for forced marriages, a widespread practice sometimes justified in the name of religion, and at other times, challenged in the name of religion. Other examples of harmful practices include enforced “sacred prostitution”, burning or other forms of ill-treatment of widows, honour crimes often perpetrated in a climate of impunity or in which such crimes are condoned, dowry killings and many manifestations of extreme disrespect. Whether they have a religious basis typically remains controversial between and within religious communities. Be that as it may, freedom of religion or belief clearly does not protect such cruel practices. If individuals or groups were to invoke their right to freedom of religion or belief in order to get permission to perform such harmful practices, this must become a case for restricting these manifestations of religion or belief, in conformity with the criteria laid down in article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 47. Before resorting to restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief, legislators or representatives of the judiciary should always analyse the respective cases with empirical and normative precision. However, States sometimes impose restrictive measures in a rather loose way, beyond the confines of article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant. This may also happen in the context of gender-related anti-discrimination policies. Based on overly simplistic perceptions, according to which religions per se constitute obstacles to the development of societies free from discrimination, some States may even be tempted to turn the principle of in dubio pro libertate upside down by restricting in case of doubt manifestations of religion or belief without providing the required empirical and normative evidence. 48. The Special Rapporteur would like to reiterate in this context that when States wish to impose restrictions they always bear the burden of proof, both at the level of empirical evidence and at the level of normative reasoning. Furthermore, for limitations to be legitimate, they must meet all criteria set out in article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant. Accordingly, limitations must be legally prescribed and they must be clearly needed to pursue a legitimate aim, the protection of “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”. In addition, restrictions must remain within the realm of proportionality which, inter alia, means they must be limited to a minimum of interference. 9 Finally, the forum internum dimension of freedom of religion or belief does not allow for any restrictions whatsoever, according to article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant. 49. A much discussed issue in the context of limitations of freedom of religion or belief concerns restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols, including __________________ 8 9 13-42191 See A/HRC/4/21, para. 38 and E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.2, paras. 104-110. See General Comment No. 22 of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 8. 13/22