42 CATAN AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA JUDGMENT State in accordance with the approach of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraph 76 above). The Court recalls that in the judgment relied upon by the Government of the Russian Federation, the International Court of Justice was concerned with determining when the conduct of a person or group of persons could be attributed to a State, so that the State could be held responsible under international law in respect of that conduct. In the instant case, however, the Court is concerned with a different question, namely whether facts complained of by an applicant fell within the jurisdiction of a respondent State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. As the summary of the Court’s case-law set out above demonstrates, the test for establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under international law. 116. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court must ascertain whether, as a matter of fact, Russia exercised effective control over the “MRT” during the period August 2002-July 2004. In making this assessment, the Court will take as its basis all the material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu (see, mutatis mutandis, Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 128, ECHR 2008). 117. The Russian Government emphasised that its military presence in Transdniestria during the relevant period was insignificant, comprising only approximately 1,000 ROG servicemen to guard the arms store at Colbaşna and a further 1,125 soldiers stationed in the Security Area as part of the internationally-agreed peace-keeping force. In the Ilaşcu judgment the Court found that there were approximately 1,500 ROG personnel guarding the arms store in 2002 (cited above, § 131). The numbers of Russian troops are not disputed by the other parties to the case (see paragraph 37 above). As for the at Colbaşna arms store, it is impossible accurately to establish its size and contents for the period 2002-2004, since the Russian Government did not provide the Court with the detailed information it had requested and since no independent observer was allowed access. However, in the Ilaşcu judgment (cited above, § 131) the Court referred to evidence to the effect that in 2003 the ROG had at least 200,000 tonnes of military equipment and ammunition there, and also 106 battle tanks, 42 armoured cars, 109 armoured personnel carriers, 54 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, 123 cannons and mortars, 206 anti-tank weapons, 226 anti-aircraft guns, nine helicopters and 1,648 vehicles of various kinds. 118. The Court accepts that, by 2002-2004, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Transdniestria had decreased significantly (see Ilaşcu, cited above, § 387) and was small in relation to the size of the territory. Nonetheless, as the Court found in Ilaşcu (cited above, § 387), in