CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 practices of the State party regarding causes, effects and responses relating to climate change. The Committee considers that an examination of whether the State party violated its general obligations under article 2 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with articles 6, 17, 24 (1) or 27 of the Covenant would not be distinct from the examination of the violation of the authors’ rights under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) or 27 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims under article 2, read alone and in conjunction with articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the Covenant are inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 7.5 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the authors’ claims under other international treaties are inadmissible, ratione materiae, because they lie outside the scope of the Covenant. The Committee observes that it is not competent to determine compliance with other international treaties or agreements. However, to the extent that the authors are not seeking relief for violations of the other treaties before the Committee but rather refer to them in interpreting the State party’s obligations under the Covenant, the Committee considers that the appropriateness of such interpretations relates to the merits of the authors’ claims under the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee considers that in this respect, article 3 of the Optional Protocol does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the communication. 7.6 The Committee notes the State party’s position that the communication is inadmissible under articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol because the State party cannot be held responsible, as a legal or practical matter, for the climate change impacts that the authors allege in their communication. The arguments raised by the parties require the Committee to contemplate whether, under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, a State party may be considered to have committed a violation of the rights of an individual under the Covenant, where the harm to the individual allegedly resulted from the failure of the State party to implement adaptation and/or mitigation measures to combat adverse climate change impacts within its territory. 7.7 With respect to adaptation measures, the Committee recalls that the authors in the present communication have invoked articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27, each of which entails positive obligations of States parties to ensure the protection of individuals under their jurisdiction against violations of those provisions.31 7.8 With respect to mitigation measures, although the parties differ as to the amount of greenhouse gases emitted within the State party’s territory and as to whether those emissions are significantly decreasing or increasing, the information provided by both parties indicates that the State party is and has been in recent decades among the countries in which large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions have been produced. The Committee notes that the State party ranks high on world economic and human development indicators. In view of the above, the Committee considers that the alleged actions and omissions fall under the State party’s jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol and therefore that it is not precluded from examining the present communication. 7.9 The Committee notes the State party’s position that the communication is inadmissible under articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol because the authors invoke potential future harms and have not sufficiently substantiated their claim that they are victims of a past or existing violation or imminent threat of a violation of their rights by the State party. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence in which it stated that a person can claim to be a victim in the sense of article 1 of the Optional Protocol only if he or she is actually affected. How concretely that requirement should be met is a matter of degree. Individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of a right protected under the Covenant must demonstrate, however, either that a State party has, by act or omission, already impaired the exercise of their right or that such impairment is imminent, basing their arguments for example on legislation in force or on a judicial or administrative decision or practice. If the law or practice has not already been concretely applied to the detriment of such an individual, 31 General comments No. 36 (2018), para. 21; No. 16 (1988), para. 1; No. 17 (1989), para. 1; and No. 23 (1994), para. 6.1; and Abdoellaevna and Y v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/125/D/2498/2014), para. 7.3. 11