CRPD/C/22/D/24/2014 which have a non-delegable duty and obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators.29 7.5 With regard to a constitutional petition under the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, the Committee notes the author’s argument that, in 2009, other victims of similar violent acts brought their case to the High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania under this Act and that the case was rejected only in 2015. 30 In that connection, the Committee notes the author’s claim that the High Court faced difficulties to compose a bench of three judges to decide on the merits of each application submitted under the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that a permanent roster of five judges had been established to enhance adjudication of constitutional cases. However, the Committee notes that the State party has not demonstrated that the establishment of this roster of five judges has enabled in practice a substantial reduction in the duration of constitutional proceedings before the High Court. Nor has the State party questioned the existence of prior High Court jurisprudence rejecting similar cases of violence against persons with albinism. In such circumstances, the Committee considers that the information before it does not allow it to conclude that a constitutional petition would have been an effective remedy in the author’s case. 7.6 The Committee further considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, a civil claim and award of compensation alone would not be an effective remedy for the purposes of article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that it is not precluded, under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol, from considering the author’s complaint.31 7.7 With regard to the author’s claims under article 6 of the Convention, the Committee recalls its general comment No. 6 (2018) on equality and non-discrimination, in which it states (para. 36) that article 6 of the Convention is a cross-cutting article and must be taken into account in relation to all provisions of the Convention. In the present case, the Committee will therefore examine the author’s claims based on article 6 in the light of the rights invoked under articles 5, 15 (1), 16 and 17 of the Convention. 7.8 As regards the author’s allegations under article 8 of the Convention, the Committee considers that the provisions of this article set forth a general obligation for States parties and cannot give rise, when invoked separately, to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol. The Committee further notes that the author’s allegations under that provision are closely linked to the allegations submitted with regard to articles 5, 15 (1), 16 and 17. The Committee will therefore examine these allegations together. 7.9 The Committee also notes that the author has invoked a violation of article 10 of the Convention, without, however, providing further substantiation or explanation as to how this article may have been violated in her case. The Committee therefore considers that this claim is insufficiently substantiated, for the purposes of admissibility, and is thus inadmissible under article 2 (e) of the Optional Protocol. 7.10 In relation to the author’s claims under article 14 of the Convention, the Committee notes that the author was never deprived of her liberty in the sense of article 14, which relates to any form of detention or institutionalization of persons with disabilities. 32 The Committee therefore considers that this part of the communication is inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 2 (b) of the Optional Protocol. 7.11 There being no other obstacles to admissibility in regard to articles 5, 15 (1), 16 and 17, the Committee declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. 29 30 31 32 See, for example, S.C. v. Brazil, para. 6.3; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Greco v. Argentina, para 51; and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Arges Sequeira Mangas v. Nicaragua, para. 96. See para 5.6 above. X v. United Republic of Tanzania, para. 7.5. See the Committee’s guidelines on article 14 of the Convention (September 2015). 11