A/66/288 repairing the ongoing consequences of the historical denial of the right to self-determination and other basic human rights that are affirmed in international instruments of general applicability. In this sense, the Declaration does not create new or special rights separate from the fundamental human rights that are deemed of universal application, but rather elaborates upon these fundamental rights in the specific cultural, historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous peoples. 64. The Declaration affirms in its article 3 the right of indigenous peoples to self determination in a way that is deemed compatible with the principle of territorial integrity and political unity of States. On these grounds, the Declaration provides a detailed list of rights that constitute “the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples of the world” (art. 43). The Declaration reaffirms basic individual rights to equality and non-discrimination, life and personal integrity and freedom, nationality and access to justice; and it calls for special attention to specific rights and needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities. 65. At the same time, the Declaration affirms rights of a collective character in relation to self-government and autonomous political, legal, social and cultural institutions; cultural integrity, including cultural and spiritual objects, languages and other cultural expressions; lands, territories and natural resources; social services and development; treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements; and cross-border cooperation. The Declaration also reflects the common understanding that indigenous peoples’ self-determination ordinarily involves not only the exercise of autonomy but also a participatory engagement and interaction with the larger societal structures in the countries in which indigenous peoples live. Hence the Declaration recognizes indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State and to be consulted in relation to decisions affecting them, with the objective of obtaining their prior, free and informed consent. 2. Normative and legal significance 66. On too many occasions in his work, the Special Rapporteur has come across efforts by States and other actors to diminish the normative weight of the Declaration by describing it as an instrument that is not legally binding. While this point can be conceded, a solid understanding of the normative significance and legal obligations related to the Declaration does not end there. 67. Whatever its precise legal significance, the Declaration has a significant normative weight grounded in its high degree of legitimacy. This legitimacy is a function of not only the fact that it has been formally endorsed by an overwhelming majority of Member States (including by the four States that had voted against its adoption, see para. 35 above) but also the fact that it is the product of years of advocacy and struggle by indigenous peoples themselves. The Declaration is the result of a cross-cultural dialogue that has taken place over decades and in which indigenous peoples have played a leading role. The norms of the Declaration substantially reflect indigenous peoples’ own aspirations, which after years of deliberation have come to be accepted by the international community. The Declaration’s wording, which has been endorsed by Members States, explicitly manifests a commitment to the rights and principles embodied in the Declaration. It 11-44942 13