CCPR/C/117/D/2464/2014 Shabaab controlled area. The Court considers that this risk would be even greater for Somalis who have been out of the country long enough to become “westernized”, as certain attributes, such as a foreign accent, would be impossible to disguise. 15 Although the European Court of Human Rights in its later decision in K.A.B. v. Sweden found that the available country information did not indicate that the situation was of such a nature as to place everyone who is present in Mogadishu at a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16 the Court emphasized the importance of including the applicant’s personal situation in its assessment. In its most recent decision regarding the situation in Mogadishu, R.H. v. Sweden,17 the Court upheld its viewpoint in K.A.B. v. Sweden, emphasizing however that the general security situation in Mogadishu remained serious and fragile and stressing the importance of including the applicant’s personal situation in the assessment. 5.5 Taking into consideration the accepted facts that he fled Somalia with his family when he was only five years old, that he has no family or social network in Mogadishu and that he lacks experience of living in Somalia, he has a well-founded fear of persecution. Furthermore, the author is particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment by al-Shabaab and risks being exposed to violence and abuse owing to his lack of understanding of the Somalian culture and traditions. 5.6 The author recalls that he belongs to the Bagadi clan, part of the Rahanweyne clan, associated with the clan family of Digil and Mirifle, which traces back their ancestry to Saab. Neither is prevalent in any of the Mogadishu districts and the Saab speak Maay-tiri, a dialect distinct from Maxaa-tiri, the dialect used by the other clan families.18 The author submits that the lack of social network and clan protection in conjunction with his distinct dialect and cultural understanding would inevitably expose him to the risk of irreparable harm. The author refers to several sources cited by the Home Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, that: Somalia has long been dominated by clan-politics, though the clan system broke down in Mogadishu while al-Shabaab [was] in power. Following the withdrawal of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 2011, a power vacuum was left which the Transitional Federal Government […] did not fill. Instead, clan-based politics reemerged with powerful individuals and militias, often from dominant clans, filling the void. Clan rivalries are evident, and many militias who have now been integrated into the Somali National Armed Forces continue to owe their loyalty to their clan leaders and groups. Clan identity is essential to access protection in Somalia. If clan protection is not available, civilians are more vulnerable to discrimination and/or targeted human rights abuses […] People returning to Somalia from overseas are extremely vulnerable unless they have strong clan and family connections, as well as the economic means to establish a life. Somalis that have left, particularly those that have been in western countries, tend to be viewed as foreigners, and may be perceived to have western agendas. This in itself puts them at an increased risk of persecution [...] It is unlikely that those who return to Somalia will be able to 15 16 17 18 8 Ibid, para. 275. See K.A.B. v. Sweden (application No. 886/11), Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 2013, para. 91. See R.H. v. Sweden (application no. 4601/14), Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 2015, paras. 67-69. See Country of Origin Information Report (note 8 above), p. 44.