E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.2 page 18 felt betrayed and sidelined by these manoeuvrings. The fact that Congress had not carried out a wide-ranging consultation on the constitutional reform, as it should have done in accordance with the commitments Mexico had made in ratifying ILO Convention No. 169, also prompted complaints to ILO. 53. The reform of the Constitution has given rise to the most diverse legal interpretations. The Mexican Academy of Human Rights considers that the text approved “denatured constitutional recognition of the indigenous peoples”, in particular because it assigns such recognition to the State legislatures, “thus making indigenous matters a local affair”. The Academy, whose opinion is widely shared, concludes that there are “adequate legal grounds for indigenous opposition to the text approved in 2001” and that the text should be revised. Another organization considers that “the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice shows the inability of the courts to consider the case on its merits and leaves it to indigenous communities, peoples and organizations with no legal resources to oppose the constitutional reform”. 54. During the years of conflict several developments of importance to the indigenous peoples took place. Some communities in the areas of EZLN influence and other regions, decided to set up “autonomous municipalities” outside existing institutional arrangements. They appoint their own authorities and apply their own usages and customs to solve conflicts and maintain social order, i.e. they exercise their right to self-determination and autonomy at a local level. The autonomous municipalities have had serious operational problems, in particular because they are not recognized by the State and federal authorities, because they lack the capacity to generate their own resources and because in some instances they have come up against opposing local interests and this has given rise to conflicts and tensions, particularly when the State authorities have tried to dismantle them. 55. In September 2003, EZLN announced the establishment of “Good Government Boards” in regions with communities that are Zapatista bases, now known as Caracoles, in order to strengthen the practice of regional autonomy and establish local bodies for administration and dialogue with Mexican society and the Government. This may doubtless be interpreted as a peace signal on the part of EZLN, opening a window of opportunity in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict while respecting the human rights of the indigenous peoples. It represents a creative application of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the indigenous peoples to self-determination. IV. CONCLUSIONS 56. Despite the Mexican State’s long history of pro-indigenous policy over the twentieth century, the accumulated setbacks suffered by the indigenous population have plainly put it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the Mexican population, facing discrimination and social exclusion and with low social and human development indices. Up until a few years ago, the indigenous peoples were not acknowledged in Mexican legislation nor did they enjoy specific rights as such. Accordingly, their human rights in particular have been violated and ignored. 57. The constitutional reform of 2001, a late and adulterated product of the San Andrés Agreements between the Federal Government and EZLN, formally recognizes the right of the indigenous peoples to self-determination but hems it round with restrictions which