A/75/590 location information, and more. 63 In some cases, officials go so far as to deprive migrants and refugees of their personal devices. One submission reported that “intercepted migrants are regularly stripped of their belongings by Croatian authorities, particularly passports and other forms of ID, cell phones and power banks, and are summarily expelled to Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 64 27. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, laws allow for the seizure of mobile phones from asylum or migration applicants, from which data are then extracted and used as part of asylum procedures. 65 These practices constitute a serious, disproportionate interference with migrants’ and refugees’ right to privacy, on the basis o f immigration status and, in effect, national origin. Furthermore, the presumption that data obtained from digital devices necessarily leads to reliable evidence is flawed. 66 Governments have also resorted to social media intelligence – the techniques and technologies that allow companies or governments to monitor social media networking sites, such as Facebook or Twitter. 67 Some of these activities are undertaken directly by government officials themselves, but in some instances, governments call on companies to provide them with the tools and/or know-how to undertake this surveillance. 68 28. One submission detailed concerning practices in Germany. 69 Pursuant to section 15 of the amended Asylum Act (Asylgesetz), asylum seekers unable to produce a valid passport or equivalent document must surrender all data carriers – not only mobile phones, but also laptops, USB sticks, and even fitness wristbands – along with login information to be “read out” by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to confirm identity or nationality. 70 The Law on Better Enforcement of the Obligation to Leave the Country (Gesetz zur besseren Durchsetzung der Ausreisepflicht) also empowers the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to share the data with other government agencies, such as security authorities and intelligence services. 71 If determined necessary, the readout takes place before the asylum hearing upon the request of the Asylum Procedures Secretariat with the asylum applicant’s signed consent, 72 although it is noted in the submission that applicants are “under exceptional pressure to follow governmental requests” for fear of negative consequences that could result from their asylum procedure. 73 This routine practice affected more than half of all first-time asylum applicants in the past two years, 74 and with regard to certain nationalities more than others raised serious concerns of de facto national origin discrimination. 29. This invasive data extraction from personal devices in Germany is unprecedented, and targets only asylum seekers, and the legalization of these measures was based on racist and xenophobic assumptions in political discourse. 75 The submission further emphasizes that data carrier evaluations have proven unsuitable to verify the identity or national origin of the asylum seeker with any degree of certainty, or to prevent abuse of asylum procedures. 76 Approximately a __________________ 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 20-14872 Ibid.; and submission by Privacy International et al. Submission by Border Violence Monitoring Network. Submission by Privacy International et al. Submission by Geselleschaft für Freiheitsrechte. Submission by Privacy International et al. Ibid. Submission by Geselleschaft für Freiheitsrechte. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 13/25