CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 Page 12 individual within the group be an individual victim of an alleged violation, would be to render meaningless the reference to ‘groups of individuals’. The Committee had not hitherto adopted such a strict approach to these words. The Committee considered that, bearing in mind the nature of the organisations’ activities and the classes of person they represent, they too satisfied the ‘victim’ requirement in article 14. 7.5 On 9 March 2005, the Committee therefore declared the communication admissible. State party’s submissions on the merits 8.1 By noted of 9 June 2005, the State party submits that there has been no violation of articles 4 or 6 of the Convention. It states that, consistent with the provisions of the Convention, article 135a of the Norwegian Penal Code must be interpreted with due regard to the right to freedom of expression. The State party’s obligation to criminalize certain expressions and statements must be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, as protected by other international human rights instruments.15 In the present case, the Norwegian Supreme Court carefully assessed the case following a full hearing, including arguments on the requirements of the relevant international instruments. It concluded that the proper balance of these rights resulted in there being no violation of article 135a in the present case, a conclusion which the Court considered to be consistent with the State party’s obligations under the convention, taking account of the ‘due regard’ clause in article 4 of the Convention. 8.2 For the State party, States must enjoy a margin of appreciation in balancing rights at the national level, and that this margin has not been overstepped in the present case. The majority of the Supreme Court found that s135a applied to remarks of a distinctly offensive character, including remarks that incite or support violations of integrity and those which entail a gross disparagement of a group’s human dignity. The majority considered that the remarks had to be interpreted in the light of the context in which they were made and the likely perception of the remarks by an ordinary member of the audience. 16 The State party submits that the Committee should give due respect to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these remarks, since it had thoroughly examined the entire case. 8.3 The State party submits that the Committee’s General Recommendation 15 should be interpreted as recognizing that the application of article 4 requires a balancing of the right to freedom of expression against the right to protection from racial discrimination. 8.4 The State party notes the Committee’s decision that the authors belong to a ‘category of potential victims’; to the extent that the authors are ‘potential victims’, 15 Reference is made to article 10 of the ECHR and article 19 of the ICCPR. The State party draws the Committee’s attention to the reasoning of the majority set out on pages 11 and 12 of the English version of the judgment, however the Court’s conclusions in this regard are not summarized in the submission. In the judgment, the majority concludes that various remarks in question are ‘absurd’ ‘defy rational interpretation’, and ‘cliché’, that they expressed no more than general support for Nazi ideology, which according to the majority did not imply support for the extermination, or other systematic and serious acts of violence against Jews. Hess, in whose memory the march was held, was not particularly associated with Holocaust. The majority also notes that the group of Sjolie’s supporters was small, and those opposing the speech were in the majority and able to voice their disapproval. 16