CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 Page 8 in question, and had involved adverse effects on their substantive rights under article 5. By contrast, none of the petitioners in this case was present when the remarks were made during the commemoration march. They were not personally targeted by the remarks, nor have they specified how, if at all, their substantive rights under article 5 were affected by the comments of Mr. Sjolie. Accordingly, the State party contends that the authors are not victims for the purpose of article 14, paragraph 1. Comments by the petitioners 5.1 In comments on the State party’s submissions of 2 December 2003, the authors contend that the communication is truly individual in nature. They state that, in any event, the issue of inadequate protection against racist speech under article 4 had been an issue in the Committee’s dialogue with the State party for some time, and that the concerns expressed by the Committee in its Concluding Observations have had little impact on the State party. 5.2 The authors reiterate that the Jewish Communities and the Antiracist Centre should be considered ‘groups of individuals’ for the purpose of article 14 of the Convention, and that they have standing to submit communications to the Committee. They note that there is nothing in the wording of article 14 which supports the interpretation that all members of the group must be able to claim victim status on their own. If such a strict reading were applied, the words ‘groups of individuals’ would be deprived of any independent meaning. They contrast the wording of article 14, paragraph 1, with the corresponding provision in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 11 which provides that only individuals may submit complaints for consideration by the Human Rights Committee. They contend that the expression ‘groups of individuals’, whatever its outer limits may be, clearly covers entities that organize individuals for a specific, common purpose, such as congregations and membership organizations. 5.3 As to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the authors claim that, in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court, any legal proceedings taken by them in Norway would have no prospect of success. They invoke a decision of the European Court of Human Rights to the effect that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies did not apply in circumstances where, due to an authoritative interpretation of the law by domestic judicial authorities, any legal action by the petitioners would be pointless. 12 They argue that the same approach should be adopted by the Committee in relation to article 14 of the Convention. Thus, even if the authors had not exhausted domestic remedies, the Supreme Court dispensed with this requirement by handing down a final and authoritative interpretation of the relevant law. 5.4 On the State party’s submission that they are not ‘victims’ for the purpose of article 14, the petitioners reiterate that article 4 guarantees to individuals and groups of individuals a right to be protected against hate speech. Failure to afford adequate protection against hate speech is of itself a violation of the individual rights of those who are directly affected by the State’s failure to fulfill its obligations. They reiterate that, just as a person’s status as a potential victim may arise when people are formally required to breach the law in order to enjoy their rights, so too may it arise where the domestic law or a Court’s decision impedes the individual’s future enjoyment of Convention rights. They further state that, in the present case, the individual authors 11 12 Article 1. Case of Open Door and Dublin Well Women v Ireland, judgment of 23 September 1992.