CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 successful civil action would enable the authors to ask for a ban on future statements by Mr. Wilders or to request a declaratory decision that Mr. Wilders’ statements were unlawful. The Committee also notes the authors’ arguments that such a civil action in the present case is not an effective remedy because their aim was not to seek compensation, but to have a determination as to whether an offence under article 137d of the Criminal Code had been committed. 9.4 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the author must make use of all judicial or administrative avenues that offer him a reasonable prospect of redress.9 It observes that a civil action under article 6:162 of the Civil Code would have allowed the authors to seek pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages for a tort for unlawful acts committed by Mr. Wilders, as well as declaratory relief. However, the Committee also observes that the authors did not seek to obtain civil compensation for any tort committed by Mr. Wilders. What they sought, through their participation in the national judicial proceedings, was a judgment against him by a criminal court for the important and distinct public force of a verdict establishing guilt or innocence under section 137d of the Criminal Code, a provision intended to implement the State party’s obligation under article 20 (2) of the Covenant. Accordingly, the authors chose the remedy afforded by the State party that was most specifically tailored to their aim.10 The Committee considers that that determination could be obtained only in criminal proceedings. The Committee therefore considers that it is not prevented, under article 5 (2) (b), from examining the communication. 9.5 The Committee notes the State party’s objection to admissibility on the grounds that the authors lack victim status and that the communication is in essence an actio popularis, as the authors failed to establish that Mr. Wilders’ statements would personally affect them. In this respect, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that “a person can only claim to be a victim in the sense of article 1 of the Optional Protocol if he or she is actually affected. It is a matter of degree how concretely this requirement should be taken. However, no individual can, in the abstract, by way of an actio popularis, challenge a law or practice claimed to be contrary to the Covenant”.11 Accordingly, any person claiming to be a victim of a violation of a right protected under the Covenant must demonstrate either that a State party has, by act or omission, already impaired the exercise of his right or that such impairment is imminent, basing his arguments for example on legislation in force or on a judicial or administrative decision or practice.12 In applying this principle, the Committee has recognized that “where an individual is in a category of persons whose activities are, by virtue of the relevant legislation, regarded as contrary to law, they may have a claim as ‘victims’”.13 Moreover, in Toonen v. Australia, although the legislative provisions challenged by the author had not been enforced by the authorities for a number of years, the author pointed, inter alia, to derogatory and insulting remarks and a “campaign of official and unofficial hatred” directed at homosexual persons, and claimed that the mere existence of the legislation fuelled harassment of, and discrimination and violence against, the homosexual community. The Committee concluded that the author “had made reasonable efforts to demonstrate that the threat of enforcement and the pervasive impact of the continued existence of these provisions on administrative practices and public opinion had 9 10 11 12 13 14 See communication No. 437/1990, Patiño v. Panama, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 21 October 1994, para. 5.2. See Andersen v. Denmark, para. 6.3. See communication No. 35/1978, Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al. v. Mauritius, Views adopted on 9 April 1981, para. 9.1. See Andersen v Denmark, para. 6.4, and communication No. 1879/2009, A.W.P. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 November 2013, para. 6.4. See communication No. 359/1989, Ballantyne et al. v. Canada, Views adopted on 31 March 1993, para. 10.4.