E/C.12/74/D/70/2018 long to process her application for public housing. On 25 May 2018, the Court upheld the lower court’s ruling, as it was of the view that the evidence of the minor offence of encroachment was not in dispute.12 According to the Provincial High Court, there was no proof that there was a possible danger to the author and her children or that the author had exhausted the legal means of solving her housing problem. It also hypothesized, albeit without evidence, that the author’s application for housing was rejected because she had the wherewithal to obtain housing on her own. At the same time, it posited the possibility that the occupation was the result of an unstable housing situation. 7.7 On 20 June 2018, the author, submitting supporting documentation a week later, applied to the Social Housing Agency for an exceptional low-cost housing rental arrangement. The author subsequently applied several times for low-cost housing and/or a suspension of the eviction. 7.8 On 19 July 2018, the Court stated that the eviction was to take place on 28 September. 7.9 On 28 September 2018, the first eviction attempt took place. Because one of the author’s children had a case of bronchitis, however, and because of a lack of police officers, it was postponed for a month. After the additional month, a new eviction date, 29 November 2018, was set. On 28 November 2018, at the author’s request, the eviction was again suspended, this time until 25 June 2019. 7.10 On 5 October 2018, the author requested a meeting with the councillor responsible for social welfare services before the Ministry of Transport, Housing and Infrastructure, and on 23 October she requested a meeting with the City Council of Leganés for a report on her vulnerability, reiterating her request for a meeting with the councillor. 7.11 On 25 June 2019, the author and her children were evicted even though the courts had not authorized a consultation on and review of housing alternatives or, in the final instance, ensured that the author had alternative accommodation. Nor did the proceedings foresee the right to be heard, directly or through legal representatives or an appropriate body, of the children of the family. In addition, the eviction took place despite the Committee’s request for interim measures. 7.12 The author claims that evicting her and her children without alternative accommodation amounted to a violation of their right to adequate housing under article 11 (1) of the Covenant. The State party argues that it was not a forced eviction, that due process was followed and that assistance has been provided to the family to the maximum of the resources available to the State. 7.13 In the light of the Committee’s determination of the relevant facts and the parties’ submissions, the issue raised by the communication is the following: whether or not the court decision to evict the author and her children without making provision for a consultation on and review of housing alternatives or, in the final instance, ensuring that the author had alternative accommodation when the eviction was ordered and then took place is a violation of the right to adequate housing enshrined in article 11 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee must also determine whether, in view of the principle of the best interests of the child, the failure to ensure that the children could exercise their right to be heard or to take into account the disproportionate impact of eviction on a female head of household and her children in the eviction process is a violation of the right to adequate housing recognized in article 11 (1) of the Covenant read separately and in conjunction with article 3 (equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights) and article 10 (3) (special measures of protection and assistance on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination). To make this determination, the Committee will begin by returning to its 12 8 The Provincial High Court noted that states of necessity obtain on the following five conditions: (a) that there is subjection, pressing and serious imminence of harm to oneself or others; (b) that there is a need to act to the detriment of another’s legal interest or to shirk a duty in order to avert that danger; (c) that the harm or damage caused is no greater than the harm or damage to be averted; (d) that the person acting in a state of necessity did not deliberately put him- or herself in that state and (e) that this person, by reason of his or her position or trade, is not required to accept or bear the consequences of the pending or present harm. GE.23-20361