the Covenant. The State party has confused the notions of its domestic law with the autonomous notion of 'law' in article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. The restriction was not 'provided by law' as understood under article 19, paragraph 3, and was not 'necessary' for the protection of a legitimate aim. ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF ADMISSIBILITY 7.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 93 of its Rules of Procedure, decide whether or not the case is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 7.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. It also notes that the State party did not contest that domestic remedies in the present communication have been exhausted with regard to any of the authors. 7.3 The Committee considers that the authors' claims have been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and declares them admissible. CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS 8.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes that in its submission on the authors' allegations, the State party has not provided any specific observation on the claims with regard to articles 19 and 27, but it has merely stated that the decisions of the domestic courts are substantiated and in accordance with the law. In the absence of any other pertinent information from the State party, due weight must be given to the authors' allegations, to the extent that they have been properly substantiated. 8.3 With regard to article 19, the authors claimed in great detail that the refusal to re-register "Oina" by the State party's authorities is in violation of Article 19 of the Covenant in its failure to be 'provided by law' and to pursue any legitimate aim, as understood under article 19, paragraph 3. In the Committee's view, issues related to the registration and/or re-registration of mass media fall within the scope of the right to freedom of expression protected by article 19. The Committee observes that article 19 allows restrictions only as provided by law and necessary (a) for respect of the rights and reputation of others; and (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. It recalls that the right to freedom of expression is of paramount importance in any society, and any restrictions to the exercise of must meet a strict test of justification. [FN9] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN9] See, inter alia, Kim v. the Republic of Korea, Communication No. 574/1994, Views adopted on 3 November 1998 and Park vs. the Republic of Korea, Communication No. 628/1995, Views adopted on 20 October 1998. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------8.4 In the present case, the Committee is of the opinion that the application of the procedure of registration and re-registration of "Oina" did not allow Mr. Mavlonov, as the editor, and Mr. Sa'di, as a reader, to practice their freedom of expression, as defined in article 19, paragraph 2. The Committee notes that the State party has not made any attempt to address the authors' specific claims, including Mr. Mavlonov's reference to the decision of the Commission which suggests that the content of the