CEDAW/C/81/D/68/2014 indigenous men and their descendants, they do not adequately resolve the discrimination faced by the descendants of disenfranchised indigenous women. According to those specialists, although the amended law does not ex plicitly discriminate against indigenous women, it fails to effectively remedy the earlier discriminatory policy; if the author’s grandmother had retained full status, on an equal basis with men of her generation in similar circumstances, then the author’s children would be eligible under section 6 (1) and would be able to pass on their status to their children, regardless of the status of their future partner, as patrilineal descendants are able to do. 20 18.10 The Committee therefore considers that the 1985 cut-off rule under the amendments of 2019, even if not currently based on the gender of the descendants themselves, perpetuates in practice the differential treatment of descendants of previously disenfranchised indigenous women. As a result of the disenfranchisement of his maternal ancestor, the author cannot freely transmit his indigenous status, and his indigenous identity, to his children and, as a consequence, his children in turn will not be able to transmit freely their status to their own children. The Committee notes that the State party has acknowledged that, according to the Department of Indigenous Services, the new cut-off date will likely require legislative changes (see para. 16.2), precisely because of the current inequities based on the previous, explicit genderbased discrimination. The Committee is therefore of the view that the consequences of the denial of Indian status to the author’s maternal ancestor has not yet been fully remedied, being precisely the source of the current discrimination faced by the author and his children. As a consequence, the Committee concludes that the State party has breached its obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 18.11 The Committee reminds the State party that failure to consult indigenous peoples and indigenous women whenever their rights may be affected constitutes a form of discrimination. 21 19. Acting under article 7 (3) of the Optional Protocol, and in the light of the foregoing, the Committee is of the view that the State party has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Convention and has thereby violated the rights of the author and his children under articles 1, 2 and 3 thereof. 20. The Committee makes the following recommendations to the State party: (a) Concerning the author and his children: provide appropriate reparation to them, including recognizing them as indigenous people with full legal capacity, without any conditions, to transmit their indigenous status and identity to the ir descendants; (b) In general: (i) Amend its legislation, after an adequate process of free, prior and informed consultation, to address fully the adverse effects of the historical gender inequality in the Indian Act and to enshrine the fundamental crit erion of selfidentification, including by eliminating cut-off dates in the registration provisions and taking all other measures necessary to provide registration to all matrilineal descendants on an equal basis to patrilineal descendants; __________________ 20 21 18/19 See Naiomi Metallic (para. 15.2 above); Cultural Survival (para. 15.4 (a) above); Human Rights Watch (para. 15.4 (b) above); and Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (para. 15.4 (g) above). Ågren et al. v. Sweden (CERD/C/102/D/54/2013), para. 6.7. Moreover, the obligation to obtain free, prior and informed consent has been qualified as a general principle of international law. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, judgment of 27 June 2012, para. 164. 22-03658