A/HRC/55/47 consideration does not become prone to cynical instrumentalization, such as the “heckler’s veto”.46 23. In addition to the necessity of considering hate speech on a case-by-case basis, it should be noted that the social and political context of a country is pertinent to the outcomes of hate speech. Societies need robust institutions based on the rule of law. Independent judiciaries, free media and active civil society organizations contribute to the resilience of societies, including by turning “hate speech into a different type of phenomenon. Prejudice continues to work its way through society, but in tandem with multilateral counter-forces, both official and informal, which can be more effectively harnessed against hatred”.47 These “material and cultural”48 tools can serve to advance civic awareness and to protect persons belonging to vulnerable groups from discrimination and violence, mitigating the cycle of hatred from hate speech into violence and discrimination and thus protecting such persons from its direct harmful effects. The rule of law and human rights institutions are critical in this matter and, in their absence, vulnerable persons are at risk, irrespective of hate speech. 24. Regarding the speaker, in recent years the speaker’s role and responsibilities have come into greater focus in relation to political and other leaders49 campaigning for office and populist support in a context that is increasingly permissive in relationship to hate speech. This links with the other tests, such as the possibly heightened context of an environment of political tension, the potential intent to provoke an audience with respect to a target group and the potential magnitude of its audience and extent. This contrasts with a speaker for whom the function heightens the value of speech, for example a journalist or an educator. 25. It is also pertinent to note whether the speaker is acting in an official capacity or not, and whether under instruction and in line with governmental policy or otherwise. A major oversight in the debate is where the distinction between “lone wolf” actors and the perpetuation and implementation of a State policy of intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion or belief is overlooked. Such acts should not be conflated or equated, as the distinction is critical in differentiating the risks that follow on from such acts. 26. Where the intent is to criticize those holding office, that is, politicians and public figures, including in relation to their religion or belief policies, this may serve as a form of policy reflection, and hence the advancement of freedom of religion or belief for all. This should be encouraged where pertinent to the defence of human rights. Those in office may include religious leaders,50 who often exercise a heightened degree of influence over the hearts and minds of their followers.51 The transparency and accountability of such officials and public figures should not be compromised unless, after careful deliberation, it is determined that a critical speech act has in fact breached the threshold of article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 27. Regarding the extent of the speech act, every step of the chain of responsibility needs to be assessed. The tendency has been to focus on one of the steps while overlooking the others. For example, the focus should not exclusively be on seeking to silence the speech at the source (identified as speaker 1), irrespective of whether an assessment at that point reaches the threshold of article 20 (2) of the Covenant, but rather to consider its spread through social media or to focus exclusively on the locations where incidents of actual harm against the target group occurred, without consideration of previous links in the chain. 28. It is particularly cynical when incidents of actual harm target those who are merely deemed to be associated with the speaker, whether because of assumed religion, racial or national origin, and there are attacks on places of worship, embassies or commercial targets 46 47 48 49 50 51 8 This is defined as allowing violence-prone minorities to prevent controversial speech, see https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-freedom-to-be-racist-9780199739691, p. 147. See https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-speech-and-democratic-citizenship9780198816416, p. 72. Ibid., pp. 71–72. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix, para. 20; see also A/HRC/40/58, annex I, paras. 18–22. Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes, available at https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-andresources/Plan_of_Action_Religious-rev5.pdf. A/HRC/40/58, annex I, para. 19, and annex II, commitments VII–XI. GE.23-25950