A/HRC/55/47 in religious or belief terms. As previous mandate holders have suggested, however, a contextual approach is important in analysing purportedly “religious” conflicts, given the dangers of further essentializing religious or belief traditions.37 18. Hateful attitudes based on religion or belief and their promotion in society often serve concrete political and economic ends. 38 They may be mobilized to justify restrictions on freedom of movement or other rights of refugees, asylum-seekers or migrants; dispossession of land; closure of businesses; boycotts; or the resignation of a religious or belief minority or caste to menial or dangerous work opportunities. Fostering religious or belief disdain may serve a political function in that promoting division and “othering” is considered expedient to certain groups or forms part of their ideology. In addition, it may serve as a tool in a quest for superiority on an individual or group basis. Exploiting and encouraging widespread prejudicial attitudes in society therefore forms part of a cynical strategy to gain or defend political influence or power. It is notable how often expressions of hatred and violence on the basis of religion or belief accompany electoral periods, times of political or economic strife or upsurges in violence in third contexts.39 Of note also is the dangerous tendency for politicians and political parties to adopt the rhetoric of, or to strike electoral pacts or coalitions with, extreme-right political parties in order to maintain or gain political power.40 IV. International human rights law framework A. Hate speech 19. The United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech was launched in 2019. While acknowledging that there is no agreed international legal definition of hate speech, in the context of the strategy, the term “hate speech” is understood as “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor”. Both the strategy and its implementation are in line with the right to freedom of expression and the support of the United Nations for “more speech, not less, as the key means to address hate speech”.41 Specifically, the strategy recognizes that the menace of hate speech does not mean “limiting or prohibiting freedom of speech. It means keeping hate speech from escalating into something more dangerous, particularly incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence, which is prohibited under international law”. 42 In addition, the strategy makes clear reference to article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that any “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. 20. Seven years prior to the launch of the United Nations Strategy on Hate Speech, the High Commissioner highlighted the challenge of “properly balancing freedom of expression and the prohibition of incitement to hatred”.43 It was for this reason that OHCHR hosted a multistakeholder consultative process, through workshops at the regional and global levels, which led to the adoption of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, in 2012. 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 6 See A/HRC/28/66. See communication sent to Brazil (BRA 2/2023). Submissions by Bahaʼi International Community; Centre for Social Justice; Evangelical Alliance United Kingdom, Justice for All; National Christian Evangelical Alliance Sri Lanka; National Secular Society; Northern Justice Watch; Search for Common Ground; and World Jewish Congress. Submission by Christian Solidarity Worldwide. See https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-andmobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf, p. 3. Ibid., p. 1. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, para. 9. GE.23-25950