A/HRC/10/8/Add.1 page 37 was insufficient for it to remove the word “Islam” from the identity card of a Muslim, was reasonable because renunciation of Islam was a matter that should be dealt with under Islamic law and therefore required determination from the Islamic Religious Authority. 139. The Federal Court indicated that the mode of renouncing a person’s religion necessarily had to follow the procedures, law or practice of the said religion. Freedom of religion under article 11 of the Federal Constitution required Ms. Lina Joy to obey the procedures, law or practice of the said religion, specifically in respect of renouncing her religion. The sharia court had an implied jurisdiction over matters relating to apostasy or conversion out of Islam. The implied jurisdiction was based on the fact that the sharia court had complete jurisdiction on the conversion into Islam, and by necessary implication, would have jurisdiction on apostasy and conversion out of Islam. This had been enunciated by the Federal Court in the case of Dalip Kaur and, as the apex court of Malaysia, is binding on all courts. 140. In conclusion, the Federal Court argued that Ms. Lina Joy was not prevented from renouncing her religion, Islam. However, because a Muslim is subject to the Islamic laws in Malaysia, Ms. Lina Joy had to go through the proper Islamic Religious Authority for the purpose of renunciation of her Islamic faith. Once she would obtain an order or a letter of confirmation of her renunciation, she would then be able to proceed to get the NRD to delete the word “Islam” from her identity card. These processes did not impede the freedom of religion of Ms. Lina Joy. In this instance, she had never approached the Islamic Religious Authorities for the purposes of renunciation of her religion, Islam. 141. According to the Government of Malaysia, the Federal Court’s decision had illustrated that, in line with article 11 of the Federal Constitution, which provision is compatible with the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the freedom of religion or Ms. Lina Joy had never been violated. Observations 142. The Special Rapporteur is grateful for the Government’s response. Concerning the right to change or to renounce to one’s religion, she would like to refer to paragraph 5 of the general comment No. 22 (1993) of the Human Rights Committee which states that “freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief”. Furthermore, provided that the Federal Constitution of Malaysia recognizes that “Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation”, she would like to refer to her framework for communications, more specifically to the international human rights norms and to the mandate practice concerning “State Religion” (see above, para. 1, category II.2). 143. In addition to the above, the Special Rapporteur would like to recall that in paragraph 3 of general comment No. 22 (1993), the Human Rights Committee underlined that no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief. As stated by the Special Rapporteur in her latest report to the General Assembly (see A/63/161, paragraph 77), indicating a person’s religious affiliation on official documents carries a serious risk of abuse or subsequent