A/HRC/46/57 become vehicles or a fertile ecosystem for incitement to genocide or advocacy that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. The above-mentioned compendium on the global regulation of online hate suggests that social media platforms are often not subject to such consequences and penalties. 49. The Special Rapporteur has been advised of the more recent steps of some platform owners to respond to messages that may constitute incitement to hate or harm, such as the recent suspension by Amazon of the Parler platform from its web hosting services because of Parler’s failure to moderate and remove violent content. 50. The Special Rapporteur also notes and welcomes the setting up of an oversight board of independent members, which will make final and binding decisions on the content that Facebook and Instagram should allow or remove, on the basis of respect for freedom of expression and the human rights obligations to remove any incitement to genocide or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. 51. However, a point which is repeatedly raised in submissions is that much of the legislation and other measures to address hate speech in social media are too vague or weak, or are insufficient. The scourge of hate speech and the harm and violence that it fuels are not only continuing, but intensifying and threatening to destabilise societies, as illustrated by recent attacks on the United States Capitol and the German Reichstag. D. Permissible restrictions on freedom of expression to prevent harm 52. As the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression emphasized in his 2019 report (A/74/486, para. 26), and is widely acknowledged in the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, content might for many be offensive, controversial, unpopular or disturbing, but freedom of expression protects the right to express such information and ideas. Minorities, in particular, can be the object of extremely widespread expression that may be offensive, intolerant and even racist: whether Governments should prohibit any such forms of expression, or at what threshold of severity or ugliness a Government would be entitled to restrict freedom of expression, are matters for debate. Nevertheless, as a matter of fundamental principle, restrictions on any form of expression must remain an exception, allowable only in cases that fall into one of three categories acknowledged in international human rights law, as outlined below. 53. On the basis of previous reports – such as the 2019 report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, the 2015 report of the preceding Special Rapporteur on minority issues (A/HRC/28/64), and others too numerous to enumerate – it is possible to identify the exceptional contexts in which freedom of expression may be restricted. In international human rights law, as enshrined in articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and repeated, broadly speaking, in other human rights treaties) and in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, there are three strictly delimited contexts in which freedom of expression may be restricted: (a) States must criminalize expression that constitutes incitement to genocide; 8 (b) States have an obligation to prohibit by law, though not necessarily to criminalize, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence; 9 (c) States may further restrict the exercise of the right to freedom of expression only as provided by law and as necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 10 8 9 10 Under art. III (c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” is punishable. Covenant, art. 20 (2). Ibid., art. 19 (3). 9