A/HRC/46/57 54. It is noteworthy, although again largely unacknowledged, that the first two contexts of permissible restrictions on freedom of expression under international law are connected to minorities being more susceptible to hate and violence from majority populations and national Governments. Most targets of genocide in modern history, for example, have been minority communities, such as Jews, Roma, Bosniaks and Tutsi. The reference to advocacy of “national, racial or religious” hatred that constitutes incitement again points to the main characteristics of minority communities around the world that are most likely to be vulnerable to targeted efforts of discrimination, hostility and violence. 55. While the three contexts of permissible restrictions on freedom of expression may appear to be unrelated, there is in fact an unappreciated connecting thread: harm, both tangible and potential. All three categories deal with harmful speech of greater or lesser gravity, moving from the obviously most harmful threat of incitement to genocide, the physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious – and usually minority – group. This worst form of harm entails the greatest obligation: criminalization of such forms of expression. 56. The second most severe form of harm is acknowledged to be any advocacy or expression of hate on the basis of national origin, race or religion. This restriction does not merely target intolerance, bias or uncomfortable prejudices. It is very narrowly constructed. States have an obligation to prohibit by law forms of expression that reach the threshold of constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence; that is, encouraging another to commit an act of harm, in the form of discrimination, hostility or violence against others. Only the most severe forms of incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence would merit criminalization. In less severe instances, as noted in the Rabat Plan of Action (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, annex, appendix, para. 34), civil sanctions and remedies should be considered, including pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, along with the right of correction and the right of reply. Administrative sanctions and remedies should also be considered, including those identified and put in force by various professional and regulatory bodies. 57. Whereas the first category entails the criminalization of certain forms of expression and the second entails prohibition by States, the third category involves situations in which it is permissible, but not mandatory, for States to regulate and restrict speech on a limited number of grounds. In such situations, there is such potential for harm that States may be permitted under human rights law to impose limited restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 58. The conditions under which such restrictions are permissible are strict and demanding, as the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression pointed out in his 2019 report (A/74/486, para. 6): “States may restrict expression … only where provided by law and necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others or protect national security, public order, public health or morals. These are narrowly defined exceptions … and the burden falls on the authority restricting speech to justify the restriction, not on the speakers to demonstrate that they have the right to such speech.” He went on to specify that any limitations must meet three conditions: legality, legitimacy, and necessity and proportionality. 59. Hate speech in social media may thus involve one of the three contexts in which freedom of expression may be subject to permissible restrictions under international human rights law. No other speech that might be reprehensible, uncomfortable or objectionable may be restricted under the fundamental pillar of freedom of expression in international law. 60. There are a number of specific issues relating to the recognition and protection of the human rights of minorities that are often insufficiently addressed when considering hate speech in its various forms and social media: (a) The extent to which States comply with their legal obligation to criminalize incitement to genocide in social and other media; (b) The extent to which States comply with their legal obligation to prohibit advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence in social and other media; 10