CERD/C/71/D/40/2007 Page 9 was not individually affected by the school’s alleged discriminatory practice of complying with employers’ requests to exclude non-ethnic Danish students from being recruited as trainees because he did not qualify for a traineeship in September 2003 and that he therefore has no legal interest in contesting it. 6.3 The Committee does not see any reason not to adopt a similar approach to the concept of “victim status” as in the Human Rights Committee’s Views referred to above, as it has done in previous occasions.6 In the case under examination, it notes that the existence of an alleged discriminatory school practice consisting in fulfilling employers’ requests to exclude non-ethnic Danish students from traineeships would be in itself sufficient to justify that all non-ethnic Danish students at the school be considered as potential victims of this practice, irrespective of whether they qualify as trainees according to the school’s rules. The mere fact that such a practice existed in the school would be, in the Committee’s view, enough to consider that all non ethnic Danish students, who are bound to be eligible for traineeships at some point during their study programme, be considered as potential victims under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the petitioner has established that he belongs to a category of potential victims for the purposes of submitting his complaint before the Committee. Consideration on the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the petitioner's case in the light of all the submissions and documentary evidence produced by the parties, as required under article 14, paragraph 7 (a), of the Convention and rule 95 of its rules of procedure. It bases its findings on the following considerations. 7.2 The petitioner claims that Danish national legislation does not offer effective protection to victims of ethnic discrimination as required by article 2, paragraph 1 (d), of the Convention, and that Danish courts do not interpret national legislation in accordance with the Convention. The Committee notes the State party’s allegation that the petitioner’s claims are abstract and do not refer to his own case. It considers that it is not the Committee’s task to decide in abstract whether or not national legislation is compatible with the Convention but to consider whether there has been a violation in the particular case.7 It is also not the Committee’s task to review the interpretation of national law made by national courts unless the decisions were manifestly arbitrary or otherwise amounted to a denial of justice.8 In light 6 In this regard, see the Committee’s Opinion in The Jewish community of Oslo and others v Norway (Communication No. 30/2003, adopted on 15 August 2005, para. 7.3 in fine. 7 Vid. the Human Rights Committee’s Views in MacIsaac v Canada (Communication No. 55/1979), adopted on 14 October 1982, para. 10 8 Vid. the Human Rights Committee’s Views in Communications Nos. 811/1998, Mulai v Republic of Guyana, para. 5.3; 867/1999, Smartt v Republic of Guyana, para. 5.7; 917/2000, Arutyunyan v Uzbekistan, para. 5.7, among others.