A/HRC/54/31 European Investment Bank and wind power projects in Norway and Mexico funded by a German-based investment and asset company and Electricité de France, respectively.57 There are growing concerns that hydropower projects are funded under the “clean energy” umbrella, despite their negative impacts on people and the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems that they cause. 44. Participation or co-ownership of projects with Indigenous Peoples reduces risks for investors. For example, Hydro-Québec, a bond-funded Canadian public corporation, adopted a policy in 2019 formalizing its commitment to involve Indigenous Peoples in its decisions and initiatives. The policy was built on long-standing partnerships with Indigenous Peoples, including a 1992 agreement to implement remedial works jointly and a 2002 agreement on joint planning, studying, implementation and operation of hydropower projects. 58 45. Governments need to incorporate a human rights-based approach in their energy transition plans.59 For example, in 2022 the Government of Chile launched its national energy transition strategy, with specific reference to clean energy projects designed and co-led by Indigenous Peoples, and a mechanism to facilitate access to funding for Indigenous projects through partnerships. The strategy provides for transparent mechanisms to foster the leadership of Indigenous Peoples in the design and management of such projects and prioritize investment and financing initiatives aimed at improving Indigenous Peoples’ access to energy services and their development.60 46. Canada has many examples of Indigenous-led green energy projects that receive federal funding or are a result of joint ventures between Indigenous Peoples and private companies. Indigenous Peoples in Canada currently own, co-own or derive financial benefit from almost 20 per cent of the country’s electricity-generating infrastructure as owners of land and treaty rights, including the right to economic self-determination. B. Carbon emission-reducing initiatives and programmes 47. In recent years, private investors, Governments, NGOs and businesses have increasingly purchased carbon credits from the mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and additional forest-related activities that protect the climate (REDD-plus) and other offset projects to negate their own emissions – either in the context of the compliance market or the voluntary market. This increased interest from international carbon markets poses a threat to the land security of Indigenous Peoples. The booming voluntary carbon market is not yet fully regulated and where regulations exist, there are no mechanisms to ensure enforcement. The rising economic value of carbon sequestered on Indigenous lands promotes land-grabbing by both the public and private sectors.61 Failure to regulate carbon market prices also means that Indigenous Peoples living in developing countries receive remuneration at a highly underestimated value. Indigenous representatives at the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change declared that carbon markets and offsets, geo-engineering, net zero frameworks, nature-based solutions and ecosystem services did not cut emissions and were new forms of green colonialism.62 48. In the Amazon Basin, Indigenous Peoples are increasingly being taken advantage of by so-called carbon pirates operating in this underregulated sector. The Special Rapporteur was informed of opaque deals for carbon rights that can last up to a century, involving lengthy 57 58 59 60 61 62 12 See communications NPL 2/2022, NOR 2/2021 and MEX 13/2021. See https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_seelos_paper.pdf. E/2022/43-E/C.19/2022/11, para. 10. See https://energia.gob.cl/sites/default/files/documentos/pen_2050_-_actualizado_marzo_2022_0.pdf (in Spanish). See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, letters to Peru (dated 28 April 2023, in Spanish) and Indonesia (dated 28 September 2009). See also A/77/238, para. 33, and A/HRC/36/46, para. 97. See http://www.iipfcc.org/blog/2022/11/7/statement-of-the-iipfcc-at-the-joint-opening-plenary-atcop27. GE.23-13366