A/HRC/51/50 with these conditions may undermine the outcome of the process and weaken the credibility of the institutions involved. 53. The adoption of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act in the Philippines as the framework for relations with indigenous peoples led to the creation of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. It is reported, however, that the Commission suffers from a lack of appropriate funding, technical capacity and effective power. 105 Similarly, it has been reported that the Implementation Committee for the Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord in Bangladesh would face challenges in implementing its mandate, including the absence of a monitoring mechanism to oversee the Committee’s decisions.106 54. In Colombia, indigenous peoples have reported delays in the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the peace agreement, owing, inter alia, to lack of funding and an implementation plan. In particular, there have been delays in agrarian reform and ensuring effective participation, which has affected the security situation in indigenous territories and communities, especially that of indigenous women and girls. 107 C. Political will and good faith 55. The implementation of consensual agreements relies on political will and good faith, without jeopardizing peacemaking efforts. 108 Full and effective implementation creates peaceful and respectful coexistence. 56. In the study on the assessment of the implementation status of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord submitted to the Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues109 highlighted the impact of political will in the implementation of the agreements, finding that resistance to its implementation was centred on opposition to the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination, autonomy, land and natural resources.110 These conclusions also emerged from the observations of successive Special Rapporteurs on the rights of indigenous peoples,111 as well as from universal periodic review processes. 112 57. During the finalization of the present study, the Expert Mechanism received allegations of attempts to repeal the Regulation Act of 1900, which would undermine the legal grounds for the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord and the rights of the Jumma peoples in that region of Bangladesh.113 The risks entailed by the lack of constitutional recognition of the Accord have been raised on several occasions. 114 58. The Expert Mechanism is also aware of situations in which the constitutional recognition of treaties has not ensured their proper application. In Canada, despite the treaty between the Mi’kmaq and the Crown on the right to fish, hunt and gather and the reaffirmation of this right in the 1999 Marshall decision of the Supreme Court, 115 the 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 Presentation of Minnie Degawan at the Expert Mechanism seminar. Submissions of civil society organizations and networks of indigenous peoples of Bangladesh, the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs; see also Devasish Roy, “Lessons from the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord”, 2021 (available at https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/4541-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-thechittagong-hill-tracts-accord.html). Submission to the fifteenth session of the Expert Mechanism by Indigenous Peoples Rights International. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, paras. 277, 295 and 296. See E/C.19/2011/6. Ibid., paras. 45–46. A/74/149, para. 47; and A/HRC/9/9/Add.1, paras. 50–56. See A/HRC/39/12, A/HRC/24/12 and A/HRC/11/18. See https://hillvoice.net/cht-regulation-1900-must-be-enforced-statements-of-27-eminent-citizens/. A/HRC/48/75, para. 37; A/HRC/9/9/Add.1, para. 50; E/C.19/2011/6; E/C.19/2014/4; and CCPR/C/BGD/CO/1, para. 12. Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 SCR 456. 13