A/HRC/54/52 17. Low-level protracted conflict has persisted for decades in some countries and continues to affect Indigenous Peoples. In other countries, even where conflict has formally ended, military presence in Indigenous areas continues. The Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh continues to be one of the most militarized areas in the world. 15 Similarly, militarization in north-east India with the imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 and in the Cordillera and Mindanao regions of the Philippines has caused migration and displacement of Indigenous Peoples within and across national borders.16 18. Militarization of Indigenous lands is often justified by national security or counterinsurgency operations. Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination is often perceived as a threat to the national security and territorial integrity of the State and as being against national developmental interests, rather than as a potential means of ensuring rights. 17 For this reason, the term “Indigenous” or “tribal” has become synonymous with separatist movements among security forces and the police in some States.18 In the Philippines, there is reportedly a trend of characterizing Indigenous areas as “red areas”, justifying the need for counter-insurgency operations.19 In Bangladesh, it has been reported that the Government similarly tries to portray Indigenous Peoples as secessionists to justify militarization. 20 19. Militarization also occurs through the application of counter-terrorism laws to Indigenous Peoples, particularly in the context of human rights defenders. Allegations have been received that counter-terrorism has frequently been used as a justification for military activities on Indigenous Peoples’ lands. 21 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has highlighted instances of terrorism offences being applied to Indigenous individuals engaging in social protest in defence of their lands in Peru, the Philippines and Chile. 22 He has further articulated that “impermissible action by Governments may be driven by the persistence of the Government in practices that exploit the respective lands and resources without the consent of, or consultation with, the Indigenous communities”.23 It has also been alleged that counter-terrorism laws may be utilized to delegitimize Indigenous Peoples’ advocacy efforts.24 20. Indigenous Peoples have frequently identified a link between development projects and militarization. Violations related to militarization that are associated with foreign business have long been highlighted.25 In some regions, Indigenous Peoples are confronted with the increasing presence of paramilitaries and private security companies, which often have close relationships with formal State militaries. For example, there are allegations of how, in 2017, at Standing Rock in the United States of America, the TigerSwan private security company worked in close conjunction with paramilitary forces, military forces and the local police, against the Indigenous individuals who protested the Dakota Access Pipeline.26 Guatemala reports more than 250,000 private security staff hired by landowners, mining companies, private conservation park owners, plantations and industrial companies. 27 United Nations human rights experts have shown their concern about the increasing use of the military for the construction of large civilian public works in Indigenous territories, such as the Mayan Train and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec Railroad in Mexico, which implies risks 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 GE.23-14759 Submission from Minority Rights Group International. A/HRC/EMRIP/2019/2/Rev.1, para. 39; see also the submission from the Centre for Research and Advocacy, Manipur. See A/HRC/48/75. See A/HRC/24/41/Add.3. Submissions from the Panaghiusa Philippine Network and the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center. Submission from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2006/2, para. 8. See A/HRC/16/51/Add.3 and A/HRC/16/51/Add.3/Corr.1, A/HRC/6/17 and A/HRC/6/17/Corr.1, and A/HRC/25/59/Add.2. See A/HRC/6/17 and A/HRC/6/17/Corr.1. See A/HRC/25/59/Add.2. General Assembly resolution 38/50, para. 21. Andrea Carmen, presentation at the virtual Expert Seminar hosted by the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 2 and 3 February 2022. Ibid. 5