A/55/280/Add.1 been no follow-up to any of the complaints that have been formally laid before the authorities concerning these serious violations of human rights. Most of the time, the central authorities simply deny the situation and invoke the economic underdevelopment of the country’s southeastern region as the reason behind this community’s departure. These authorities even accuse the Assyro-Chaldeans of fabricating complaints in order to obtain refugee status in Europe. In other cases, where evidence of oppression is particularly glaring, blame will be laid entirely on the PKK, while the local authorities are absolved of any responsibility. 121. When it comes to the situation of the Syriac community in Istanbul, it was found that some Syriacs have adopted a low profile, seeking to protect themselves through a degree of anonymity. Other Syriacs, apparently the majority, are hoping to leave Turkey, because of the rise of Islamism and the obstacles that the authorities are placing in the way of the community’s attempts to maintain its religious and cultural identity. 122. While saying that they understand certain shortcomings of the State, and recognizing that it takes time to establish democracy, particularly in the setting of armed conflict that prevails in southeastern Turkey, the Orthodox Syriac representatives have formulated a very significant demand, which is that they be treated as full Turkish citizens, and not as outsiders. V. Conclusions and recommendations 123. The Special Rapporteur presents below his conclusions and recommendations on Turkish legislation relating to freedom of religion and belief and on Turkish policy in this area, and finally on the situation of non-Muslim communities, in particular, with respect to freedom of religion and belief. 124. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to note that Turkey’s legislation, and particularly its constitutional legislation, provides absolute guarantees of freedom of religion and belief and protects its manifestations (in particular freedom of worship), while imposing certain limitations (article 14). 125. Some of these constitutional limitations contain vague expressions that lend themselves to very broad interpretation which, in turn, may lead to extensive intervention by the State and hence excessive restrictions on freedom of religion and belief. This applies to the expression “violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation” as well as the phrase “destroying fundamental rights and freedoms”. 126. The Special Rapporteur recommends that precise terminology be devised and that legislation, including constitutional provisions, be interpreted in a manner consistent with international standards of human rights and with the jurisprudence and general comments of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission, in its General Commentary No. 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, on article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declared that restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief are permitted only if they are prescribed by law, are necessary to ensure public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and are applied in a manner that does not vitiate the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The Commission has also stated that restrictions must only be applied for the purposes for which they were prescribed and they must relate directly to the specific objective they are to serve, and be proportional to that objective. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or in a discriminatory manner. 127. The Turkish constitution enshrines the principle of secularism in relations between the State and religion. The Turkish Constitutional Court has interpreted this secularism in accordance with the principle of neutrality, whereby, on one hand, religion is a personal affair and, on the other hand, no manifestation of religion may be restricted by the State except under precise conditions, namely the protection of public order and safety and the public interest, and only in a manner consistent with the jurisprudence of the Commission on Human Rights. 128. This interpretation, basing secularism on the principle of neutrality, would seem however to be contradicted by certain constitutional and legislative provisions that empower the State, through the Department of Religious Affairs, to structure Muslim religious affairs and to wield excessive powers of religious management such that religious practice appears to be regimented by the government and Islam is treated as if it were a “State affair”. This situation is compounded by the attitude of the State which, in practice, promotes a Hanafi conception of Islam to the exclusion of any other interpretation, including that of 23